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A brief analysis of Pakistan and Afghanistan Relations (1947-1998)

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Abstract

Pakistan and Afghanistan have shared a complex and tumultuous relationship since the formation of Pakistan in 1947. The two neighbouring countries have been engaged in a struggle for dominance, often marked by political and military conflicts. In the initial years, Afghanistan was one of the first countries to recognize Pakistan as an independent state, and the two nations shared close cultural and economic ties. However, tensions began to rise in the 1950s when Afghanistan refused to recognize the Durand Line as the official border between the two countries. This issue, coupled with Afghanistan's support for Pashtun nationalists in Pakistan, led to strained relations between the two countries. The situation further deteriorated in the 1970s when Afghanistan became a Soviet ally, and Pakistan supported the Mujahideen in the Soviet-Afghan war. This intensified the border conflicts, and Afghanistan accused Pakistan of supporting insurgent groups. The relationship reached its lowest point in 1988 when Pakistan closed its borders with Afghanistan, cutting off crucial trade routes and causing severe economic damage to Afghanistan. The situation improved in the 1990s when both countries signed the Islamabad Accord, which aimed to end the conflict and establish a peaceful relationship. However, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the late 1990s reignited tensions as Pakistan was accused of supporting the militant group. Despite attempts at reconciliation, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has remained fragile and marked by mistrust and hostility. Therefore, this study aims to analyse the relations between both the States while adopting qualitative and historical method of analysis.

Keywords: *Pakistan, Afghanistan, complex, relationship, Soviet ally, Durand line, Mujahideen, military conflicts, militant group, fragile, hostility*

1. Introduction

Pakistan and Afghanistan have a long and complex history of relations dating back to the independence of both countries in 1947. Despite sharing a border and cultural similarities, the two nations have often found themselves at odds with each other, with a multitude of factors contributing to the strained relationship. The initial years after independence were marked by a sense of brotherhood and solidarity between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with both countries being part of the short-lived Central Asian Union in 1955. However, tensions soon emerged as Afghanistan refused to recognize the Durand Line, the disputed border between the two countries drawn by the British in 1893. This issue became a major point of contention as Afghanistan continued to lay claims to parts of Pakistani territory, leading to frequent border skirmishes and strained diplomatic relations.

In the 1960s, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan took a turn for the worse with the emergence of the Pashtunistan issue. Afghanistan, which has a significant Pashtun population, began to push for an independent Pashtun homeland, which would include parts of Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This further deepened the divide between the two nations, with Pakistan accusing Afghanistan of supporting separatist movements within its borders. The situation was further exacerbated by Afghanistan's close ties with India, Pakistan's arch-rival, as well as its support for the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The 1970s marked a period of relative stability in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship, with the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972, which recognized the Durand Line as the official border between the two countries. However, this period was short-lived as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the dynamics of the region. Pakistan, along with the United States, became a key player in the Afghan resistance against Soviet forces, providing training, weapons, and shelter to Afghan Mujahideen fighters. This further strained relations with Afghanistan, as the country accused Pakistan of interfering in its internal affairs.

The 1990s saw a significant shift in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, was one of the few countries to recognize the Taliban regime and provide them with financial and military support. This led to further tensions between the two nations, with Afghanistan accusing Pakistan of supporting the Taliban's extremist ideology. The relationship reached a breaking point in 1998 when the Taliban captured the Afghan city of Mazar-e-Sharif, resulting in a large influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan.

1.1 Literature Review

The relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan has been a complex and constantly evolving one since the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Several literatures have shed light on the various facets of this relationship, tracing its history from the early days of independence to the end of the 20th century. These literatures have examined the political, social, economic,

and cultural dimensions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship, providing valuable insights into the dynamics of this often-tumultuous relationship.

One of the earliest literatures on this topic is 'Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: Historical Perspectives' by Abdul Ghafoor Breshna, which provides a comprehensive overview of the relationship between the two countries from 1947 to 1980. Breshna delves into the historical factors that have shaped this relationship, including the Durand Line dispute, the role of the Pashtun ethnic group, and the impact of the Cold War. He also examines the impact of various leaders on the relationship, such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Mohammad Daoud Khan.

Another important literature is 'The Pashtuns of Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Historical Basis of Their Conflict' by Rajiv Gandhi, which focuses on the ethnic and cultural dimensions of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship. Gandhi argues that the conflict between the two countries is rooted in the historical grievances of the Pashtun community, who have been divided by the Durand Line and have faced discrimination in both countries. He also explores the role of Pashtun nationalism and its impact on the relationship.

In 'The Pakistan-Afghanistan Relationship: The Search for Strategic Depth' by Stephen P. Cohen, the author analyzes the strategic dimension of the relationship, particularly in the context of Pakistan's search for 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan. Cohen argues that Pakistan's support for the Taliban in the 1990s was driven by its desire to counter Indian influence in Afghanistan and gain strategic advantage in the region. He also examines the impact of this strategy on the relationship between the two countries.

Shahid Javed Burki's 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal' provides a broader perspective on the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship by examining the role of foreign policy in shaping this relationship. Burki argues that Pakistan's foreign policy has been largely driven by its security concerns, which have been heavily influenced by its relationship with Afghanistan. He also discusses the impact of regional and global powers on the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship.

In 'The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan' by Robert D. Crews, the author delves into the role of the Taliban in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship. Crews argues that Pakistan's support for the Taliban in the 1990s was a key factor in the rise of this militant group, and examines the impact of this support on the relationship between the two countries. He also explores the complex dynamics between the Taliban and the Pakistani state.

'The Afghan-Pakistan Conflict: A Historical Perspective' by Marvin G. Weinbaum focuses on the historical roots of the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Weinbaum argues that the issues of Pashtun nationalism and the Durand Line dispute have been the main sources of tension between the two countries, and that these issues have been exacerbated by the interference of external powers. He also examines the role of domestic politics and regional dynamics in shaping the relationship.

Finally, 'Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations: The Post-9/11 Era' by Riaz Mohammad Khan provides a contemporary analysis of the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Khan examines the impact of the US-led war on terror on the relationship, as well as the efforts of both countries to address their mutual security concerns. He also discusses the prospects for future cooperation between the two countries and the challenges that lie ahead.

1.2 Research questions

- How did the Cold war and the involvement of external powers impact Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from 1947 to 1998?
- How did the issue of Pashtunistan and the Durand Line impact Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from 1947 to 1998?

1.3 Objectives of study

- To investigate the impact of Cold war politics on Pakistan-Afghanistan relations 1947 to 1998.
- To analyse the role of ethnic and tribal dynamics in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations 1947 to 1998.

1.4 Research Methodology

The research methodology for studying Pakistan-Afghanistan relations from 1947 to 1998 involved a multi-faceted approach that combines a literature review, comparative and historical analysis, qualitative data interpretation, and critical evaluation. This methodology provides a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics, complexities, and factors that have influenced the relationship between these two neighbouring countries.

2. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations (1947-1998)

Pakistan and Afghanistan have an unpredictable relationship from the beginning. As soon as the hope arises for the betterment in relations a crisis emerges. However, it is encouraging that soon after each crisis, both the states take measures to bring the situation back to normality. They sit together and attend bilateral conferences to resolve their disputes but at the same time they also raise allegations against each other for interfering in their domestic and internal matters.

2.1 Pak-Afghan relations in historical perspective

There was a dispute over parts of North West Frontier Province (now KPK), soon after independence in 1947, where the majority of the residents belong to the Pathan tribes. They voted to join Pakistan in referendum. Some people wanted an independent country to be known as Pakhtoonistan. Afghanistan had sided with those Pathans who wanted either an independent nation state or to join with Afghanistan. They still stake the claim to some of the NWFP on the basis of that part seized from them 200 years earlier. The border, known as Durand Line, that ran through Pathan territory had caused frequent demands for independence. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the leader of the separatist movement, had called for a boycott of the 1947 poll. Afghanistan is landlocked and needed a transportation route for its goods. Pakistan offered the Afghans a route through Pakistan during talks in late 1947. It expected Afghanistan to drop its support for Pakhtoonistan in return. The Afghan government refused and instead signed an agreement with the USSR for a transport route through Russia. [1]

Soon after freedom Afghanistan started an aggressive publicity campaign against Pakistan through its press and radio. An example in this regard was the Afghan Parliament declaration that:

"It does not recognise that imaginary Durand or any similar line" [2]

The foremost objective of this anti-Pakistan publicity was to force Pakistan to agree to demand of Pushtoonistan. Afghanistan initiated this movement on the request of its two main

allies, India and former Soviet Union. Afghanistan unceasingly adopted an aggressive approach against Pakistan and has been meddling in Pakistan's internal matters since then. Afghanistan powerfully opposed Pakistan's access into UNO but Pakistan communicated its wish to foster neighbouring relations with Afghanistan. [3]

Sardar Najibullah Khan, the Afghan king Zahir Shah's representative to Pakistan, in November 1947, declared that Afghans have cultural relations with the Muslims of subcontinent. Political and economic ties that bind both the States cannot be broken.

On 3rd December 1947 Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah wished that relationship between both states should be friendly and the negotiations that would take place increase the goodwill between Pakistan and Afghanistan. [4]

2.2 Period of Ill-fated Relations (1948-1963)

In February 1948 the government of Pakistan planned to cultivate ambassadorial dealings with Afghanistan. Mr. I.I. Chundrigar was agreed the first envoy of Pakistan to Afghanistan. The Afghan administration sent Sardar Shah Wali Khan as their first representative to Karachi. It was expected that sociable bonds would be strengthened with time after the setting up of diplomatic dealings between the two states. The prominent frontrunners of the both nation states exchanged visits to each other's countries. Minister of communication, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, took a delegation to Afghanistan to participate in the festivities of independence. Likewise a prominent religious personality of Afghanistan, Mullah Shor Bazar, paid a visit to Pakistan in 1949. In the same year 'Faqr of Appy prompted by Afghan administration, instigated the tribal people to upsurge against Pakistan which however failed. [5]

The optimism that collaboration with Afghanistan would be of joint benefit encouraged Pakistan's Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan's statement to the Constituent Assembly on 9th January 1950, that Pakistani administration had invited to discuss with government of Afghanistan all issues of mutual benefit concerning the border area, economic, educational and moral uplift of the masses.

These are the feelings that had been repeated by successive Pakistani leaders and government. [6]. The relation between Pakistan and Afghanistan were not normal in 1950. The cause of the grave situation was the Afghan King Zahir Shah's speech which opposed to Pakistan's identity. Afghan flag was raised with decency on the celebration of Independence Day, but Pakistani flag was damaged and the Afghan Air Force dropped anti-Pakistan material in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.

On 30th March 1953, Pakistan-Afghan dealings were at the lowest receding tide when Pakistan's consulate in Kabul was attacked and anti-Pakistan Afghans timed down the Pakistani flag from the Pakistani embassy and substituted it by Pushtoonistan flag. The Pakistan's official took the decision to break the diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in reaction of these anti-Pakistan protests in Afghanistan and attacks over Pakistan Embassy and the Consulate Offices. For more than five months the Pakistan-Afghanistan border had remained closed. In 1954, Afghan administration had expressed its annoyance attitude

towards Pakistan for joining the Washington Camp and participating in the U.S. backed military and economic alliances e.g. SEATO, CENTO and NATO. Pakistan's embassies in Qandahar and Jalalabad were attacked in 1955. [7]

As soon as Pakistan broadcasted the introduction of "One Unit" on 30th March, 1955 a mob attacked the Pakistani Embassy in the Afghan capital, Kabul. The mobsters set aflame the Consulate office block as well as ruined the essential record of the Consulate. Pakistan hurled its strong opposition on this action of wildness supported by Afghanistan Administration, which was rudely turned down by them. Iskander Mirza, the Pakistani President in August 1956, had an exchange of ideas with leaders of Afghanistan when he paid an official visit there in a hospitable environment. In 1957 Pakistani Prime Minister, Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy toured Afghanistan. In 1958, Zahir Shah the King of Afghanistan visited Pakistan and had arbitration with Mr. Feroz Khan Noon, the Pakistani Prime minister as well as Mr. Iskander Mirza. In November 1959, Sardar Daud Khan the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, had a tour to Pakistan. In 1959, the ambassadorial links between the two republics were cut off, which were rebuilt in 1962 by the struggles of the late Shah of Iran. In 1958, a plan permitting trade route to Afghanistan through Pakistan was decided between the two states. It was assured by this settlement that Pakistan will permit maximum services of conveyance, municipal tax and custom duties etc. to the Afghans as their possessions passed through Pakistan. On the other hand, the Afghan Administration, on numerous occurrences dishonoured the pact. Prince Naeem, the Afghani Foreign Minister continued hurling baseless allegations against Pakistan. He adopted an intimidating tone that if Pakistan did not solve the dispute of Pakhtoonistan amicably, Afghanistan would make use of other methods. 31st August was stated by the Afghan Administration as Pakhtoonistan Day and condemned Pakistan during the celebration. [8]

The Afghan Prime Minister Daud and King Zahir Shah visited Pakistan, in reply of Pakistan's official tours to Afghanistan. The political leadership of both states had taken some positive steps to make route for better relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Both government had decided to organise the air service on both sides and agreed to establish a linkage between Kabul and Karachi. Both administrations had taken the decision on the Transit Trade Agreement. The purpose of the trade agreement was to implement the rule of imposing no custom on imported goods, which were destined for Afghanistan.

In October 1958, Ayub Khan, the first military ruler, having Pashtun background and leading the Pashtun dominion over the important administrative seats in Pakistan, desired of good relations with Afghanistan. He expressed his opinion that the Pashtun in Pakistan had respect and they had no sense of deprivation. His administration had more hard line of action. He had no interest to discuss the Pushtoonistan issue because it had no ground authenticities or legitimacy and there was no need to pay attention on the issue that was created by the Afghan administration itself.

It was becoming increasingly tough for consulate officials appointed by Pakistan in Kandahar, Kabul and Jalalabad to pursue their legal undertakings safely due to non-stop anti-Pakistan protest campaigns in Afghanistan.

The only option left with the Pakistani administration was to ask the trade agencies of Afghanistan in Quetta as well as Peshawar to exit. The Kabul administration got hold of the Kabul consulate office as well as embassy in Afghanistan and cut off diplomatic dealings with Pakistan. [9]

One of the first reactions of Ayub Khan after coming to power was to express his anxiety about the extensive road building and airstrip construction in Afghanistan. He pronounced that this massive activity would enable sizable military forces to march into West Pakistan at short notice and the time was not far off when these roads in Afghanistan would prove to be a real threat to the entire subcontinent.

In early 1959, Ayub Khan invited the Afghan Foreign Minister Sardar Naim, to visit Pakistan. Ayub Khan openly appealed to Naim to abandon the policy of enmity towards Pakistan as it would be to the mutual advantage of both the states to live as friendly neighbours.

Sardar Naim toured Pakistan nevertheless the incompatibility of opinions contributed to the let-down of discussions. No press release was heard. On the other hand, Manzoor Qadir, Pakistani Foreign Minister proclaimed that the meetings had been very open and more interaction between the leaders of both States was agreed upon.

Nevertheless, behind the scenes, irritated by the constant Afghan claims in the Pakistani regions, Manzoor Qadir was believed to have made the proposal to his corresponding individual through the dialogues that Pakhtuns on both sides of the border are one and they want to be either with Pakistan or Afghanistan. A referendum was held in Pakistan and it should be held in Afghanistan too.

According to Foreign Office representatives, at this point the Afghan Foreign Minister went red. The Afghan rulers were seemingly not enthusiastic to grant the same right of self-determination to tribesmen living within their country.

Subsequent to these futile talks, police investigation increased on the Pakistani diplomats in Kabul. On 18th July 1960 the British Foreign Office confirmed that the British and the US embassies in Kabul were no longer able to retain Pakistanis on their staff, for the reason that the Afghan administration was reluctant to refresh the travel document of Pakistanis residing in Afghanistan. Manzoor Qadir exposed that Pakistan had dispatched a number of follow-ups complaining against ill-treatment of Pakistanis in Afghanistan on 11th August 1960. Qadir doubted that the Afghan troops, braced by a small number of tanks, in September 1960, had gathered on the boundary west of Bajaur as well as the Afghan administration prearranged just about 70,000 part-time soldier.

An Afghan contingent reinforced by Afghan military divisions on 23rd -24th September 1960, entered into the Pakistani region of Bajaur to interrupt in native clash between the Nawab of Dir and his son as well as the Khan of Khar. The Bajauris detested this external interference in a personal conflict and counterattacked the Afghans before some Pakistani forces or volunteers could land to deal with the take-over. Kabul Radio refuted this description, and highlighted that the administration of Pakistan by hurling such allegations was targeting to distract public views and to conceal the information that the Pakistani forces had been directed in the region contrary to the desires of the native inhabitants. The administration of Pakistan launched a complaint with the Kabul administration against the annexation, in addition to the intimidating accumulation of Afghan army and volunteer forces on its boundary on 5th October 1960.

The Afghan regime responded to Pakistan's objections by asserting that Pakistani military was conducting oppressive manoeuvres against the Pakhtuns, together with frequent and wide-ranging bombarding spells in the Bajaur region.

At last the Pakistani administration admitted on 6th April 1960 that bombarding acts had occurred in the Bajaur region in early March 1960. Lt-General K.M. Sheikh, Pakistan Minister for States and frontier region said that two houses had been bombed 24 hours after the residents of the area had been warned to leave because they were being used as headquarters and for dumping arms by an Afghan agent, Badshah Gul. The Afghan agent had been distributing arms, ammunitions, and money amongst the tribesmen. The agent fled to Afghanistan. In May shooting took place between Afghan and Pakistani troops at various border points. Pakistan stressed that Afghan forces had attacked two Pakistani posts at Mishinai and Sangpura in the Bajaur area on 19th -20th May, and PAF planes on 21st May were ordered to destroy machine guns and mortar positions from which these attacks had been carried out. Pakistan asserted that several Afghan representatives were imprisoned in Mardan districts and Peshawar, who had confessed during investigations that they were employed by the Afghan regime to assassinate Pakistani administrators and to begin terrorist activities in Pakistan.

By August 1961, relations worsened to such a degree that Pakistan informed the Afghan administration that it planned to close its embassies at Jalalabad and Kandahar, and asked it to withdraw its consulates at Peshawar and Quetta. Afghanistan asked Pakistan to withdraw this note by 6th September, failing which it would break diplomatic relations with Pakistan. Pakistan let go the Afghan threat. In September 1961 diplomatic relations between the two countries for the second time were shattered. Pakistan also denied entry to 200,000 Pawindas who hike down to Pakistan in winter for seeking occupation and grassland for their livestock. Transportation facilities were also again suspended which proved to be a severe economic blow for Afghanistan, mainly in the sphere of its fruit trade. In 1962, an attempt was made by Shah of Iran to conduct reconciliation but he too could not bring a warm up as Afghanistan insisted on the prior reopening of its consulates in Pakistan. It was throughout this period that King Zahir Shah came to realise the futility of his state's strategy of bitterness towards Pakistan as practised by his premier Daud Khan. In March 1963 Zahir Shah dismissed Daud, the utmost dominant person in Afghanistan behind the Pakhtoonistan undertaking. He held responsible Daud Khan of taking along the Afghan economy to the verge of failure. [10]

2.3 Détente in relations (1963-1973)

Pakistan requested Britain to take care of its concerns in Kabul which the Afghan Administration declined to approve. On 23rd May 1963, ambassadorial dealings between Pakistan and Afghanistan were re-started after discussions organised in Tehran. Both the neighbours approved to inaugurate Consulates and likewise decided to setup Embassy in Pakistani city of Quetta and Afghan city of Jalalabad. [11]

In March 1963, a major change occurred in Afghanistan in the form substitution of Sardar Daud who had always sponsored Pushtoonistan forcefully by Dr. Muhammad Yousef. The ruling elite replacement in Afghanistan changed the environment and the Kabul Administration had decided to utilise the diplomatic relations with Pakistan in the hopeful way.

Yahya Khan broadcasted the suspension of the One Unit scheme, welcomed by NWFP political leadership and Afghanistan's leadership but the new Afghan government did not stop the publicity against Pakistan and remained actively involved to celebrate Pushtoonistan Day at the official level. The Afghan representatives always communicated anti-Pakistan feelings during the public meeting and talked about the independent Pushtoonistan. It is also

verified that Afghan representatives in the United Nations raised the question of Pushtoonistan but did not formally demanded to UN authorities to include the Pushtoonistan issue in its agenda as the recognised dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

In 1970, both the government decided to sign an agreement regarding the exploration of economic opportunities. In the reply of Pakistani Finance Minister Muzafar Ali Qizlibash's official visit to Kabul the Afghan regime also expressed positive gesture to accept Pakistan's offer in the field of medicines, agriculture, engineering and fertiliser.[12]

A Pakistani press officer had stated that in 1970 the permanent Head of Afghan Foreign Office was most impatient to impress on him that Zahir Shah did not want his formal commitment to the idea of Pushtoonistan to cause conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan and block the prospect of trade as well as commercial association amongst the two neighbours.

When the year 1971 opened, the relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were in a less hostile segment. The Durand Line issue lay unsettled, and the propaganda war did not cease but the conflictive stage was played down and the propaganda reduced, so that a degree of friendliness prevailed to the extent that the likelihood of economic assistance was being discussed.

In his first visit abroad, less than a month after assuming the Presidency of Pakistan, Bhutto included Afghanistan in his list of Islamic states to be visited.

Bhutto also wanted to seek guarantee from Zahir Shah that Afghanistan would not agitate for Pushtoonistan. There is no printed record as to what was said to Bhutto by Zahir Shah, but there was no public pulling out by Kabul on its Pushtoonistan issue. According to Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, then Pakistan's Federal Minister of Information, the general impression was that Pakistan could have a working relationship with Afghanistan. This was the state of affairs that existed between Kabul and Islamabad till mid-1973.

Relating to the period 1971 to 1973, King Zahir Shah was in operational control of Afghan foreign policy. He was believed to be a dove on the Pushtoonistan issue, and was keen on extending economic collaboration with Pakistan. No confirmation has come to light that he was at any time prepared to recognise the Durand Line, which would have paved relations between the two countries and could have been of joint benefit. Pakistan could not assume that a timely pleasantness was a solution to its basic problem with Afghanistan. As long as the Durand Line was not recognised by Kabul the implication was that Afghanistan reserved to itself the right to defy Pakistan's territorial integrity and impede in its internal matters. [13]

In August 1972, Pakistan was conciliatory to grant Afghanistan the advantage of sending sixty automobiles laden with fruit as well as other commodities to India through Pakistani check post at Wagah. Regardless of this friendly gesture on 1st September 1972, Pukhtunistan Day of the imaginary state was formally celebrated throughout Afghanistan. In his speech at the United Nations in October 1972, the Afghan Foreign Minister repeated the earlier implication and debated that in 1947 the attachment of Balochistan and NWFP in Pakistan caused a defilement of Pakhtun's right of self-governance and regions which were by no means part of entire India were incorporated in the new republic. [14]

2.4 Reversal of Rapprochement (1973-1978)

The Afghan strategy towards Pakistan all of a sudden transformed when Sardar Daud came into power and Zahir Shah's regime was overthrown by a military rebellion on 7th July, 1973.[15]

As a sponsor of the dispute of Pushtoonistan, the Daud administration all over again publicised the problem before the world public. The Afghan Administration for the first time ever had gathered its regular military on the Pakistani boundary to pressurise the Pakistani Administration. In reaction Pakistani administration had to take the counter measure of positioning the regular armed forces to reciprocate the fierce intention of the Afghan Administration. Zulfikar Bhutto announced that the President of Afghanistan Muhammad Daud needs to be dealt as an aggressor on Balochistan and NWFP disputes.

As soon as Daud administration started crack down policy against the adversaries, the Afghan who were against him fled to Pakistan and the Administration of Pakistan not only provided the shelter to those Afghan refugees but also had guaranteed them political and moral backing. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani were noticeable figures who launched the uprising movement from Pakistan's soil. These Afghan political characters had continued their confrontation movement against the Afghan Administration from Peshawar to weaken the influence of the Daud's Government. Daud's administration encouraged the nationalist rebellion in Balochistan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto decided to launch military action against the Baloch autonomist leaders who had the support of the Afghan administration. Several Baloch influential fled to Afghanistan and the Afghan administration welcomed the Baloch leaders who were not contented with the Pakistani Government and were involved in the Baloch Liberation Movement. The Afghan Administration provided all sort of assistance to these Balochs for the purpose of encouraging the internal disturbance in Balochistan and to sponsor the anti-Pakistan movement in Balochistan. Zulfikar Bhutto characterised the replacement of the Afghan Administration by the Daud's takeover and elimination of kingdom as the internal matter of Afghanistan. Daud had remained hardliner on the Pushtoonistan issue and had anti-Pakistan stance in the past too.[16]

Agha Shahi gives some confirmation of the manoeuvres employed by Islamabad. According to him, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (one of the leaders of Afghan Mujahideen), in 1973 came to Pakistan with fifteen hundred men and set up links with Pakistan Intelligence Agencies. He was opposed to Daud and according to Lawrence Lifschutz, Hikmatyar was the key player of 5000 Afghans trained, supplied and controlled by Pakistan and used to carry out anti-government activity in Afghanistan.

Not only was Pakistan stirring up trouble within Afghanistan but, according to intelligence sources, Bhutto sent a message to Daud threatening him that Pakistan would launch an attack on Jalalabad.

Kabul never officially referred, or replied, to that threat, but only two month after the Daud-led coup, his administration suspected Islamabad of being involved in anti-government activity. From then on, at intervals, Kabul blamed Pakistan of being involved in the revolt against the government and in various conspiracies to overthrow Daud. [17]

Bhutto administration began to support two Afghan Islamist militia to gain influence over Kabul on the border issue: Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-e-Islami and Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami.[18]

Pakistani newspaper by 1974 began to carry out reports of Afghan inspired and directed sabotage in Pakistan, including a bomb blast in Quetta when Bhutto was addressing a meeting on August 12, 1974, and an explosion in Peshawar which killed NWFP Chief Minister, Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao. The Pakistani administration believed that the Afghans were providing facilities to AjmalKhattak to carry out sabotage in the NWFP.

Kabul had sought to internationalise the issue of Balochistan in 1974 by submitting a document, P0240 of September 25, 1974 to the UN. In October 1975, at UNESCO conference in Iran the Afghan delegations distributed a map showing Pakistani territories included in Afghanistan.

Months earlier in BBC discussion, Daud had called an entire world to help in the creation of Pakhtoonistan. Kabul's posture created grounds for serious concern. The Pakistani paper stated that the leaves of Afghan army officers had been negated in November 30, 1975, some army units, including some trained in mountain warfare, were being moved close to the Durand Line and a communication centre was being set up near the border. The reports determined that the move was not preliminary to any attack, but designed to facilitate dissident activities inside Pakistan.

There were accessible signs to indicate that Kabul also had its links with those who were involved in the uprising in Balochistan. The Baloch leaders had close ties with Kabul. However, there was no material aid from Afghanistan between 1973 and mid-1975. The latter was itself not in a position to arm the Baloch. After mid-1975, under pressure from Baloch leaders, specially Mengal and Marri, Afghanistan supplied some weapons to the Baloch, roughly five hundred 303 rifles, twelve 3x6 mortar and some 7.9mm Bren guns, for which the ammunition was not available in Pakistan. Explosives were not supplied to the Baloch although they were being supplied to the NAP in the NWFP. Even Baloch refugees were only allowed into Afghanistan in late October 1974, and then, too, Daud was hesitant to allow in too many Baloch.

Bhutto stated that developments in Afghanistan were an internal affair and Pakistan would advocate the attitude of non-interference and hope for reciprocation by Kabul.

While in Quetta on July 24, 1974, he offered Kabul a bilateral contract to rule out interference in each other's domestic affairs. Bhutto offered to go to Kabul to discuss the stabilisation of Pakistan-Afghan relations on October 31, 1975.

On the other hand, Bhutto began to apply pressure on Kabul. In the week after Daud's takeover, Bhutto warned that if Kabul continued in upholding the Pakhtoonistan issue, and creating problems on the border, Pakistan would take care of it.

He declared on May 3, 1974, that Pakistan would allow no meddling in its internal matters and no external or domestic intrigue would be allowed to succeed in Pakistan.

Pakistan's policy of applying the stick was not restricted to firm denial of the Afghan policy, but it also indicated at the official level the sort of advantage that could be taken of Afghanistan's own weakness. Bhutto's policy was to use the ethnic question along with other latent problems to stir up trouble against Daud and strike at the foundations of his regime-carrying the war into adversary's camp.[19] A noteworthy change appeared in 1976 on the subject of Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan when Daud grasped the fact that the policy of aggression will not serve its interest and moreover his regime will be at stake if he continues

his unfriendly policies towards Pakistan.[20] In June 1976, Bhutto paid a five-day visit to Kabul at Daud's invitation. Expectations were dreary. Pakistan's Urdu-language daily, Mashriq (Lahore), quoted Daud as saying that Afghanistan wanted good relations with Pakistan but the only point of difference between the two was that Kabul wanted Pakistan to grant the Pakhtuns and the Baloch their basic rights including the right to freedom of the NAP leaders whom Bhutto had arrested on February 10, 1975.

Many months preceding Bhutto's visit, the press reported him as holding out the disguised hope that if his talks with Daud were successful, he would take a generous attitude with those who were convicted. At the same time he asserted that there was no question of dealing with issues that were Pakistan's internal affairs and this was a position repeated on the eve of his parting for Kabul. The talks, however, went well. A joint communique was issued at the end of the visit. One solid suggestion in the communique was that both countries would abstain from hostile propaganda against each other. No mention was made of Durand Line, nor the Pakhtuns and Baloch problem.

From Pakistan's point of view the reference to the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence" created a glow of hope. One of those principles was mutual non-interference and non-intervention which had application to Kabul's standpoint on Balochistan and NWFP. Pakistan saw in this the probability of a more flexible approach on Kabul's part. However, at official level, Daud was still claiming to Kabul the right to back the cause of the Baloch and the Pakhtuns. [21]

Mr. Z.A Bhutto invited to hold meetings to end disputes. Pakistan. The Secretary General of the O.I.C Mr. Hassan Al Tehami, offered his good offices to eliminate the misinterpretation between the two neighbours. He held deliberations with Mr. Z.A Bhutto and Sardar Daud. He emphasised that the leaders of the two republics should cultivate welcoming approach towards each other. Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto took initiative and offered assistance to the Afghan populace who were hit by an earthquake.

Sardar Daud offered an invitation to Mr. Z.A Bhutto to tour Afghanistan. During his stay in Afghanistan Mr. Z.A. Bhutto stressed the necessity to cultivate closer bonds between the two states. He also gave invitation to Sardar Daud for a stay in Pakistan which was accepted by the Afghan President. Sardar Daud visited Pakistan for an official tour on 20th August 1976. He exchanged opinions and conveyed his wish of upholding sociable affairs with Pakistan. After these excursions by the front-runners, the dealings between Pakistan and Afghanistan enhanced.[22] The joint communique that was dispensed at the conclusion of the visit repeated the commitment of the two states to the previous communique, and the whole visit was, officially, a recap of Bhutto's visit to Kabul.[23]

The instantaneous outcome of these official visits of the both countries was in the response of reducing the tension between the countries and both administration agreed to find out the settlement of the Pushtoonistan issue on ground realities. The Daud Administration decided to recognise the standing of Durand Line as the global frontier in between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Bhutto uplifted the sanction on Afghanistan and allowed Afghan airplanes to take flight over Pakistan's territory. For developing good relations with Afghanistan, Bhutto Government uplifted the imposed sanctions on Afghan trucks to use Pakistan's territory for reaching India.

All these positive signals were showing the intensive efforts of the Pakistani administration to diffuse the tense environment between the both states.[24]

Agha Shahi indicated that Daud agreed in principle that he would recognise the Durand Line, but when it came to actual agreement, he said he would need time to get the Afghans to accept it. There was no direct deal over the release of the NAP leaders, though Daud did say that if they were free, recognition of the Durand Line would become more pleasant to the Afghans. The Afghans appeared to have high hopes of a covenant working out. Daud was not successful in getting Afghanistan to accept the agreement and could not publically confess that an agreement was in the offering. In May 1977, Daud gave an interview to the London-based Business Times that although no steps could be taken to resolve the Pakistan-Afghanistan problem without the release of the NAP leaders.

The basis of the problem was the right of Baloch and Pakhtuns people. He was supporting the right of sovereignty for the Baloch and the Pakhtuns. This is a direct denial of Daud's alleged acceptance of the Durand Line. That acceptance implied the admission of Pakistan's sovereignty up to that Line, and the simultaneous abandonment of the Afghan support for the right of self-determination of the Baloch and Pakhtuns, and Kabul's role as spokesmen for that cause. Daud's proclamation strengthened the argument that he could not get the Afghans to accept the deal, but it also raises questions as to the accuracy of Bhutto's version. Perhaps Bhutto was being over-optimistic in his analysis of what Daud could accept, all the same the fact that at one place Bhutto claims that the agreement was actually put down in writing.

When Zia took over in July 1977, Daud stated it an internal matter, and expressed the hope that conditions would carry the day wherein a settlement could be found. Pakistan indicated its enthusiasm to continue the policy of goodwill towards its neighbours.

Zia toured Kabul for two days on October 9, 1977. No joint statement was issued, nor was any public mention made of any specific issue, but general declaration of friendship and goodwill were expressed and Daud was invited to Pakistan. From Kabul's point of view, a very positive progress was that after assuming power, Zia released from prison Marri, Mengal, Bizenjo and Wali Khan. A Pakistan-Afghan commission was agreed upon to promote economic and cultural co-operation and Zia was invited to Kabul. Zia could not benefit himself of Daud's invitation. The latter was dethroned and killed in a coup commanded by the Afghan army and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan on April 27, 1978, in an event the Afghan administration termed the Saur Revolution. Noor Muhammad Taraki, the leader of Khalq faction of the PDPA assumed power as the President. Pakistan recognised the Taraki government. [25]

In September 1978, Zia-ul-Haq visited Kabul and tried to persuade Taraki and Hafizullah Amin to discuss the political dissimilarities. The talks directed on the point of settlement of the political issue. Both the Afghan leaders did not show any kind of positive movement as regarding the political issues.

In September 1979, at Havana Non-Aligned Summit Zia-ul-Haq talked to Taraki. In the mutual meeting, Tarakai invited Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. Pakistan welcomed the new positive development. Agha Shahi visited Kabul and talked to Amin for preparing the ground, which concludes the future talk between Zia and Taraki. Later Babrak Karmal took the reins of the administration in Afghanistan.

On May 22, 1979 Babrak Karmal indicated on Kabul Radio that his government will take care the wishes of Pashtuns and Balochis. In delivering speech on Kabul Radio, Babrak Karmal emphasised the issue of the Durand Line, Pashtuns and the Balochis.[26]

During 1978-1979, Pakistan's feedback to the Afghan strategy was low-key. On diplomatic level Pakistan worked for a stabilisation of relations with Kabul. Kabul's irredentist claims and the danger they presented to Pakistan's security were always there. But its intensity had been felt more when there was an upsurge of resistance in Balochistan or in the NWFP, as during Bhutto's tenure. After Zia's takeover, and the release of the Baloch and Pakhtun leaders, the situation had finished to be critical. Zia had less reason to assume an apparently confrontational posture towards the Afghan.

Pakistan could not disregard the situation in Afghanistan, nor remain unresponsive to the reaction of the people of that country. A powerful impression had provoked Pakistan to react to events in Afghanistan was the factor of Islam. The Mujahideen did not declare Jihad in December 1979. In April 1978 they had already done so. They launched their Jihad against Taraki, and asked for Pakistan's help. They also developed close ties with Pakistan's Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party which was a most reliable and keen supporter of Mujahideen. The JI had close links with Zia, and it would have been difficult for the latter to refuse aid to Mujahideen.

Even though the help given by Pakistan was not disclosed on the record, leave aside its extent, one may safely assume that it was of a modest nature, given Pakistan's own restrictions at the time. There was a number of reports referring to the obsolete nature of the weaponry used by the Mujahideen. In mid-1979 the CIA made contact with the Afghan Mujahideen and decided to support them but at low intensity.[27]

2.5 Afghan resistance against Soviet Union (1979-1992)

Approximately 1, 20,000 Russian military arrived in Afghanistan on 27th December, 1979. The Afghan citizens exhibited a strong confrontation to this evident belligerence. Babrak Karmal was chosen the Head of the Administration. The Afghan Mujahideen got hold of weapons to be used against the intruder for the protection of their territory. Pakistan gave their full assistance to the Afghan Mujahideen by giving refuge to them in Pakistan. Pakistan rejected to be acquainted with any administration shaped under the influence of the Soviet army. The Air Force of Afghanistan, on various incidents, dishonoured Pakistani Airspace and severely bombarded Pakistani regions. Nonetheless, the Soviet military was not able to bear the courageousness of the Afghan citizens and had to leave Afghanistan agreeing to Geneva Accord of 1988. [28]

In April 1982, the High Commissioner for Refugee in United Nations informed that the total of Afghan immigrants in Pakistan had crossed the 2.5 million digit.[29] In 1988, after the assassination of Zia (President of Pakistan), State Department of U.S.A blamed WAD (a KGB made Afghan secretive intelligence organisation) for extremist occurrences inside Pakistan in 1987 and 1988. With resources from the global community through the High Commissioner for Refugees at UNO (UNHCR), Pakistan housed more than 3 million Afghans at numerous immigrant sites, mostly nearby Peshawar in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The United States of America as well as others delivered billions of bucks in philanthropic aid to Afghan migrants in Pakistan. At hand were no regular institutes established for the emigrants but merely madrasas in which learners were proficient to turn into followers of the Taliban

movement. As soon as the Soviet Union started abandoning Afghanistan, during the Mohammad Najibullah's term of office, global community and UNHCR helped 1.5 million Afghan immigrants to be send home from Pakistan to Afghanistan. [30]

The administration that the Soviet installed under Najibullah fought on for nearly three more years. In April 1992, after the proxy government finally collapsed a prolonged war of succession began among the Mujahideen political parties. On 24th April 1992, at a meeting in Peshawar the coalition leaders reached an agreement. An Islamic Council headed by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi was installed for two months after which Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani was to become president for four months. A provisional government was then to be formed for two years. Mojaddedi abided by the agreement but Rabbani declined to yield power when his term finished. Fighting broke out among the Mujahideen parties.

2.6 Events leading to emergence of Taliban and their rule (1993-1998)

On 7th March 1993, the Afghan influential agreed on the establishment of administration for a span of 18 months at a convention in Islamabad, with engineer Hekmatyar as the prime minister and Professor Rabbani lasting as the president. The agreement almost immediately broke down and Hikmatyar bombarded the capital city of Kabul and was repelled. [31]

The relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan distorted when Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani's forces killed six Pakistanis and detained seven by putting false charges. The situation became serious when Pakistan embassy in Kabul was rocketed and later on Ahmed Shah Masood's forces directed a possible effort to attack the Foreign Minister. The Pakistani citizens were considered as agents of Pakistan's Intelligence agency in Kabul. In the grave situation the Pakistani officials decided to close its embassy in Kabul in July 1994. Amir Usman, Pakistan's diplomat in Kabul had given the impression preaching that it was the incident of hostage taker killing which contributes as the major factor in enhancing the bad relations between the Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani Administration and Islamabad.

Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, during her second term, had established a committee, consisting of Interior Minister, Major-General Naseerullah Babar, holding the position of Advisor on the Afghanistan issue, Ijaz Haider Zaidi, Governor of NWFP, Major-General Khurshid Ali Khan and Additional Secretary, Foreign Office, Iftikhar Murshid were also present including representatives from Army General Headquarter officials. Pakistan became mindful of the fact that the Taliban might not be able to hold out against the joint forces of Dostum and Masood. At Islamabad meeting with President of Pakistan, Farooq Ahmed Lughari and the Chief Intelligence Directorate were also there to participate in the debate on the Afghan issue. Finally the committee determined to carry on efforts to bring about a settlement between Taliban and anti-Taliban alliance for introducing the ceasefire between the both parties. It was finally decided that Naseerul Babar should keep on his efforts towards making the three power groups accept a formula for making the final settlement of the conflict.[32]

In autumn 1994, a delegation commanded by General Nasirullah Babar went to Chaman, on the border between the two countries. The security provisions were made by Sultan Amir Tarar. At the time the southern provinces were in a state of disorder, with numerous commanders fighting, and he would prove a useful guide through the turmoil. When Babar returned, he send out a convoy with goods along the southern route, well thought-out by the Army's National Logistics Cell. The state of affairs had changed: thirty military trucks were

captured by a local chief. The Taliban had by then taken the city of Kandahar and were able to rescue the convoy. The sending of the military convoy at a time when the Taliban were dominant was interpreted as support for the movement.

So much trade passed through Afghanistan during the early months following the Taliban assumption of power that food prices in Pakistan fell. While Pakistani support was imminent from an early stage of the Taliban movement's existence, the connection was delicate and statements from both the Pakistani ISI as well as the Taliban early on confirmed the uneasy nature of relations. The ISI and Pakistan aimed to exert control, while the Taliban leadership manoeuvred between keeping its independence and sustaining support. By the time Taliban had moved up northeast towards Kabul, political analysts were broadcasting a new style of fighting which their new 4x4 vehicles allowed them to conduct. The vehicles need not have been given to them directly by Pakistan—indeed there were numerous other patrons or traders during this period who could have eased such a supply—but their use in battle may have been suggested by Pakistani mentors (some of whom were seen within Afghanistan during this time) and at the very least they had to arrive via Pakistan.[33]

Mullah Omar was announced as the Amir-ul-Momineen in a gathering. A former Taliban chief of intelligence, Mullah Khaksar discussed that the consultation was prearranged and held under the supervision of Pakistani actors as well as their concerns. He declared that they worked towards isolating the Taliban's leadership from the rest of the Muslim community as well as to maintain their individual control and organise interaction with the Taliban front runner. Additionally, the designation, confirmed that the Taliban would stay under Mullah Omar's direction as long as he was alive and stayed suitable to rule [34]

Individuals from Afghanistan as well as seminaries in Pakistan generally in Karachi, Balochistan and NWFP, united with Mullah Omar in 1994. When he acquired the authority, he was asked to visit Pakistan time and again, but he continuously declined, mentioning wartime circumstances in his state. He came across delegations from Pakistan's intelligence organisations but by no means permitted any of his commanding officers to interact with Pakistan saying they were continuously engaged in operations. Pakistan was shocked to observe that Taliban gave a free rein to the most awful defilement of human rights in Afghanistan underneath the cover of their own explanation of Islam. Formerly visiting performers of Pakistani football squad were imprisoned by the Taliban for playing in shorts. Not only this, their heads were clean-shaven as penalty. In the last week of October 1994 Pakistan's main official communication with Mullah Omar occurred at Spin Boldak on the Pak-Afghan boundary to search for a safe route for a Pakistani philanthropic and relief convoy. One of the foremost devotees of the Taliban movement was Al-Rasheed Trust centred in Pakistan and they gave logistical and broadcasting assistance from Karachi. [35]

The Taliban also seized a former Hizb-e-Islami arms dump in Pashai Ghund close to the border with Pakistan. This huge reserve—according to the ISI director at the time—consisted of 17 tunnels worth of ammunition and weapons, enough to supply three divisions, and was an important moment for the movement which from that point onward had few problems arming itself.[36]

Pakistani madrassas were supplying men and material to Taliban. Hundreds of pupils from Peshawar were sent to Kandahar according to rumours in March 1995. The Taliban exhibited an outright talent to accumulate significant sum of combatants and associates in a little time. A crucial part in the Taliban's swift progress and victory was due to madrasa students being

sent from Pakistan which incorporated remarks that young Tajiks and Uzbeks from north of Afghanistan were also amalgamating and travelling to Kandahar. The enrolment of madrassa students in addition to the backing offered by Ulemas and Imams from border areas do not essentially refer to state-sanctioned patronage. The connections between the Pakistani Ulema as well as Afghans were old and strong for the Taliban to plea for provision from across the boundary. The Taliban movement had two principle supporters in Pakistan: General Naseerullah Babar and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (that part under the leadership of MaulanaFazlur Rahman) representing Deobandism.[37]

On 6 September 1995 Pakistan's hope of friendly relations with the government of Islamic Afghanistan had a setback when its consulate officers in Kabul was thrown out by a government-sponsored crowd. One member of staff was killed, the envoy and forty officials were badly wounded and the building, and all official records were burnt. Pakistan exercised tolerance and prospects of good relations seemed to brighten in May 1996 when a visiting Afghan government delegation admitted obligation for the rebuilding of the embassy even though it appealed lack of resources to discharge the responsibility.[38]

Hundreds of foreign citizens who came to join the jihad stayed behind in Pakistan, and some of them were involved in acts of terrorism. The bombing of Egyptian embassy in Islamabad was credited to them. Agents of Rabbani regime in Kabul committed acts of disruption in Pakistan. In December 1995, a car bomb explosion in Peshawar bazaar killed over forty and injured a hundred innocent people.[39] The armed establishment of Pakistan turned out to be obsessed with Taliban rule in Afghanistan.[40]

Al-Zawahiri's operatives were found involved in the 19th November 1995 attacks on the Egyptian embassy in which 16 people were killed(excluding two suicide bombers) and over 60 wounded. The operation provoked an immediate reaction from the Pakistani security services who rounded up some two hundred Arabs in Peshawar. Al-Zawahiri's operation contributed to this effort and bin Laden was forced to start looking for a new sanctuary. The bombing was also provocation enough for Pakistanis to pursue any Arab jihadis still remaining. Around two hundred were reportedly flown out by bin Laden in planes that he specifically chartered for the purpose.

The breakdown of Taliban defences and their disastrous defeat stage-managed by Masood with the major retaliation launched in July and August 1997, recapturing Bagram air base and bombarding Kabul airport, endangered the Taliban's control of Kabul. Heavy fighting caused thousands of civilian losses and 50,000 people fled their homes. This pushed the Taliban to assemble whatever forces were available. Accounts tell of forced recruitment in mosques in Kabul and madrassas being closed in Pakistan to send more fighters for Taliban in order to strengthen the defence lines around the capital city. [41]

On September 19, 1998 Pakistan's director general of ISI met with Mullah Omer in Kandhar and advised him to drive out Osama Bin Laden from Afghanistan or hand him over to the government of his native country. [42]

The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif had given the impression on 17th November 1998, that Pakistan needs Taliban style of justice for re-establishing the confidence of people and in case of rapist, the actions of Taliban are remarkable, such kind of decisions should be executed in Pakistan. [43]This shows clearly that the Pakistani government was impressed by the policies adopted by the Taliban to secure the people of Afghanistan.

Table No: 3.1

Title: Summary of main events

Year	Area of conflict	Area of cooperation
1947	dispute over parts of KPK	
	Durand line issue	
	Afghanistan opposed Pakistan's entry in UN	
1948		ambassadors were appointed to start diplomatic relations
		exchange of visits started on official level
1949	Afghanistan instigated the tribal people to revolt against the Pakistani government	
1950	Zahir Shah opposed Pakistan's identity	
	Afghanistan Airforce dropped anti-Pakistan material in FATA	
1953	Pakistani Embassy in Kabul was attacked	
	Diplomatic relations were broken for 5 months	
1954	Afghanistan was angry with Pakistan because of joining SEATO,CENTO and NATO	
1955	Pakistan's consulate in Kabul were attacked and Pakistan protested	
1956		President Iskander Mirza paid an official visit to Afghanistan and offered help in boosting trade and infrastructure facilities
1957		Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suharwardy toured Afghanistan
1958		King Zahir Shah came to Pakistan.Pakistan allowed Afghan goods to pass through Pakistan
1959	Diplomatic ties were cut off but later they were re-established	SardarDaud visited Pakistan
		Ayub Khan invited Afghan Foreign Minister Naim to Pakistan
1960	Pakistan protested against the mistreatment of its citizens in Afghanistan	
	Pakistan suspected the deployment of Afghan troops near the border and	

	protested	
	Afghanistan blamed Pakistan for attacking its own people	
1961	Pakistan planned to close embassy in Jalalabad and Kandahar	
	Diplomatic relations ended and Afghanistan suffered economic blow	
1963		Diplomatic relations were restored
1965		Afghanistan supported Pakistan in Indo-Pak War
1968		Zahir Shah was given a warm welcome in Pakistan
1970		Both government signed an agreement regarding the exploration of economic opportunities
		Zahir Shah was not in favor of Pushtoonistan
1971	Durand line issue remained unresolved	Relations were less hostile
1972	Pukhtoonistan Day was celebrated in Afghanistan	Pakistan allowed 60 trucks to go to India after passing through Pakistan
1973	SardarDaud's adversaries were given protection in Pakistan	
1974	Newspapers alleged Afghan involvement in Quetta bomb blast	Bhutto offered bilateral contract to avoid interference in Afghanistan
	Balochistan issue internationalised by Kabul at UN and UNESCO conference	
1975	Afghanistan supplied weapons to Balochistan	
1976	Durand Line, Pukhtun and Baloch problem remained unsettled	Bhutto paid a visit to Afghanistan on SardarDaud's invitation
		Agreed to avoid hostile propoganda
		SardarDaud came to Pakistan
1977	SadarDaud wanted the release of NAP members	Pakistan-Afghan commission was agreed to promote economic and cultural co-operation
		Zia toured Kabul for two days
1978		Pakistan recognised Taraki government
		Zia-ul-Haq visited Kabul to persuade Taraki and Hafizullah Amin to discuss the political dissimilarities
1979	BabarakKarmal said that his government will take care of the	Pakistan supported Afghanistan against Russia

	wishes of Pashtuns and Balochis	
	Babrak Karmal emphasised on the issue of Durand Line	
1982		More than 2.5 million refugees were in Pakistan
1992		Coalition leaders of Afghanistan held a meeting in Peshawar to find an agreeable government structure
1993		Meeting was held again in Islamabad to ensure peaceful transition of power
1994	Pakistan officials decided to close its embassy in Kabul due to the mistreatment with Pakistani citizens	Efforts were made to reach an agreement between Taliban, Dostum and Masood for peace in Afghanistan
	30 military trucks were captured by local chiefs	A delegation went to Chaman and food prices fell in Pakistan due to trade relations
		People from Afghanistan and Pakistan joined Mullah Omer at Spin-Boldak
1995	Consulate in Kabul was attacked by a government sponsored crowd	100 students from Peshawar were transported to Kandahar
1996		Afghan government delegation admitted the obligation for the rebuilding of embassy
1997		Pakistani madrassas were closed to send more Taliban to strengthen defence around Kabul against Masood forces
1998		Director General of ISI met with Mullah Omer in Kandahar on Osama Bin Laden issue
		Nawaz Sharif praised Taliban style of justice

Made by researcher cited in: Nigel Smith, Pakistan History, Culture, and Government (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007)

Also see: Abdul Sattar, Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2005 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007)

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan from 1947 to 1998 has been marked by a complex and tumultuous history. Beginning with the establishment of Pakistan as a sovereign state in 1947, the two countries have shared a long and porous border, cultural and historical ties, and a shared religion of Islam. However, their relationship has also been characterized by periods of tension, conflict, and mistrust.

One of the key factors influencing the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship during this period was the issue of the Durand Line. The disputed border, drawn by the British in 1893, has

been a source of contention between the two nations, with Afghanistan refusing to recognize it as the official border. This has led to border skirmishes, accusations of cross-border terrorism, and strained diplomatic relations.

Another important aspect of the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship during this time was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Pakistan, under the leadership of General Zia-ul-Haq, became a key ally of the United States in supporting the Mujahideen resistance against the Soviet occupation. This led to an influx of Afghan refugees into Pakistan, creating social, economic, and political challenges for the country.

Furthermore, the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s further complicated the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. While Pakistan initially supported the Taliban, viewing them as a stabilizing force in war-torn Afghanistan, their support was met with criticism from the international community. The Taliban's sheltering of Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, further strained the relationship between the two countries.

Additionally, the issue of cross-border terrorism has been a major source of tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghanistan has accused Pakistan of providing safe haven to militant groups, such as the Haqqani Network and the Afghan Taliban, who launch attacks on Afghan soil. Pakistan, on the other hand, has accused Afghanistan of sheltering anti-Pakistan militant groups, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Despite these challenges, there have been some positive developments in the Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship. In the 1980s, Pakistan and Afghanistan signed the Geneva Accords, which aimed to bring an end to the Soviet-Afghan War and establish an independent and neutral Afghanistan. In 2014, the two countries signed a landmark security agreement, the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS), which aimed to improve cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, border security, and intelligence sharing.

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