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## **Climate Diplomacy in the Global South: Balancing Development Goals and International Climate Commitments under SDG 13**

**Kulsoom Fayyaz<sup>1\*</sup>, Shabnam Gul<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup>Lecturer, Department of International Relations, LCWU, Lahore, Pakistan

<sup>2</sup>Chairperson, Department of International Relations, LCWU, Lahore, Pakistan

\*Corresponding author email: kulsoom.fayyaz@lcwu.edu.pk

### **Abstract:**

Climate diplomacy in the Global South has become a crucial area of focus as developing nations navigate the complexities of balancing climate action with development goals. This paper explores the key themes of climate justice, finance, adaptation, and South-South cooperation, emphasising how the Global South is reshaping the climate agenda. The study examines the tensions between industrialised nations and the Global South, with a particular focus on the demands for equity and financial support as outlined in SDG 13 and the Paris Agreement. It highlights the urgent need for adaptation measures to protect vulnerable communities from the devastating impacts of climate change, and the establishment of Loss and Damage funds as a critical step toward climate justice. The paper also delves into the growing role of South-South cooperation, where developing countries share knowledge and resources to drive sustainable development and climate resilience. By examining the leadership roles of nations like India, Brazil, and South Africa, the paper underscores the Global South's emerging agency in climate diplomacy, advocating for fair and inclusive climate solutions. Through these efforts, the Global South is not only calling for support but also offering innovative solutions and leadership in the fight against climate change.

**Keywords:** Climate diplomacy, Global South, Climate Justice, SDG 13, South-South Cooperation, Climate Resilience, Sustainable Development

### **Introduction:**

Climate change is a very significant global problem, particularly in the context of climate diplomacy where there is a conflict between the Global South and the industrialised nations (Kamal Uddin, 2017). The interdependence between the two groups can be demonstrated by the common case scenario when the delegates of the vulnerable island states demand justice because of the impact of pollution, whereas the developed states demand that they should not be entirely blamed; however, they want to be collectively blamed (Modern Diplomacy, 2023). In this discussion, the dilemma of climate diplomacy that exists in the necessity to bridge the gap between those who were the perpetrators of climate change and the victims of climate change comes out. The issue of establishing a trade-off between fulfilling the pressing needs of developing countries in the Global South regarding their developmental goals such as poverty reduction and economic development on one hand and climate requirements and commitments on the other hand is a thin line to walk (Gomes-Echeverri, 2018). The SDG 13 emphasises the significance of urgent measures that are supposed to be undertaken in dealing with climate change since it is among the factors that disrupt sustainable development (Owusu-Sekyer et al., 2024). The objectives of SDG 13 aim at bringing the climate action to the national policy of development but also to allocate financial resources, in particular, the ones of the developed nations to help the Global South to reach climate and development goals (Asia Society, 2017).

The possibility of climate change to undo developmental gains has become more apparent, and the consequences of climate change including more powerful hurricanes, extended droughts, and

changed weather patterns are increasing poverty, hunger, and instability in the Global South (Signé & Mbaye, 2022). The fact highlights the interdependence between climate action and development as actions to increase clean energy and resilient infrastructure will support not only climate mitigation but also help to achieve SDGs SDG7 (clean energy) and SDG9 (resilient infrastructure) (Gan et al., 2023). In this regard, Global South countries need to increase their climate commitments without considering the present development demands and should abide by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) which implies that countries with lower historical emissions and capacity to tackle climate change require special treatment (Jha & Dev, 2024). These challenges and strategies are discussed in the thematic analysis herein and revolve around major aspects such as equity, financial support, adaptation, loss and damage, and South-South cooperation in the context of balancing the climate action and development goals in SDG 13 (UN South-South Cooperation, 2023).

This paper is a qualitative thematic analysis of climate diplomacy as perceived by Global South based on secondary sources such as academic literature, policy briefs and international treaties. A number of themes emerge including equity and climate justice, financial support, and capacity building, adaptation and loss and damage, integrating climate action with development, and South-South cooperation and leadership. The discussion covers the years since the mid-2010s (since the Paris Agreement) up to the present, emphasising the manner in which developing countries are manoeuvring and redefining climate diplomacy to reconcile their development goals with climate commitments in SDG 13.

### **Literature Review:**

Climate diplomacy stands as one of the most critical questions in the framework of international relations, especially in the case of the Global South, where developing countries are trying to reconcile climate action with their developmental desires (Abdenur, 2021). One of the most important aspects in the discussion about climate diplomacy is the conflict between the economy and environmental protection. The worries of most Global South countries today are encapsulated in the most famous quote of Indira Gandhi, who in 1972 at the Stockholm Environmental Conference wrote: Poverty is the worst form of pollution (Massive Earth Foundation, 2023). The countries that are historically underdeveloped in terms of development state that without proper support climate policies might multiply existing inequalities and reduce their ability to grow (Van Den Bergh, 2017). This has been an important idea in the position of the Global South regarding the climate negotiations where the developing nations insist that climate action must not be a hindrance to their development agendas. The politics of such concerns points to the historical accountability of industrialised countries on the contribution of greenhouse gas emissions, which numerous developing countries claim must be reflected in the climate action plans (Vogt -Schilb & Hallegatte, 2017). With the introduction of the Paris Agreement in 2015, this discussion changed as all countries had agreed to have climate action plans, but with a recognition of differentiated responsibilities and equity in financing and transfer of technology (Byrne and Rich, 2021) was recognised.

Theory Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) sheds light on the basic principle of climate talks because developed countries should lead on achieving emissions reductions and other support to developing countries, as the latter should focus on development (Petri & Biedenkopf, 2019). This is also connected with climate justice when nations such as those of the Global South complain that they are being disproportionately harmed by the effect of climate change, although they made a small contribution to the emission of greenhouse gases. The equity

debate centres on the historical emission, emission rights per capita and the right to development whereby the majority of third world countries have been demanding fair treatment and financial assistance by the rich countries to enable them achieve their developmental and climate objectives. Climate justice is thus a recurrent issue in the negotiation process where Global South actors put forth the ethical aspect of climate diplomacy. This development/climate tension is especially notable in the case of emerging economies such as India, which, despite having one of the largest emission totals in the world, still struggles with such issues as funding and assistance in meeting its ambitious climate goals (Kortetmaki, 2016)

#### ***Gaps in Literature and Theoretical Framework:***

Although the concept of CBDR has long been used to influence climate negotiations, the literature offers a gap with respect to how it is being implemented in modern climate agreements (Singh, 2022). There are many researches on the theoretical significance of CBDR, and only a few have taken detailed reviews on how the principle has been implemented in practice as far as finance and technology transfer are concerned. Insufficient finance and technology, as Global South countries tend to note, is one of the most prominent obstacles towards the realisation of both SDG 13 and the wider development objectives (Barua, 2020). Moreover, the issue of historical responsibility and climate finance remains a controversial topic, and developed countries are frequently accused by developing nations of not meeting their promises on financing it, which still remains an unanswered aspect of mainstream climate diplomacy literature (Leal Filho et al., 2021).

Also, much of the literature is concerned with the international climate talks and the policies that come about as a result of these talks, yet there is a huge gap in the knowledge about the formulation and implementation of domestic climate policy in the Global South, and specifically on the approaches of adaptation and loss and damage. Although adaptation strategies are a vital part of climate diplomacy, the majority of discourse tends to put more emphasis on mitigation or emissions reduction without considering the costs of adaptation and disaster recovery that disproportionately affect Global South countries (Islam et al., 2022). Another area that has not been adequately explored in connection with how it promotes climate resilience and financial support is South-South cooperation. Unlike North-South discussions, South-South cooperation offers a special platform of mutual learning and the creation of contextually-relevant solutions, which the full potential has not been fulfilled in climate diplomacy (Islam et al., 2022).

#### ***Theoretical Background: Climate Justice and Sustainable Development:***

In order to fill such gaps, the researcher will use the theoretical framework of Climate Justice and Sustainable Development, and it is necessary to balance climate action with development priorities (Kaklauskaitė & Streimikiene, 2024). Climate Justice does not only entail minimising emissions, but it also entails that issues such as social and economic disequilibrium that are worsened by climate change must be addressed: that there is a redistribution of the burden of action such that it does not necessarily lie on people who have contributed least to the crisis. With this framework, there is a need to have a fair sharing of burden so that the Global North countries that have contributed the most to climate change are given the responsibility to fund and support mitigation and adaptation in the Global South. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and SDG 13 specifically, reinforce this view by demanding inclusive, equitable and sustainable climate solutions devoid of undermining progress in development (UN South-South Cooperation, 2023). The other significant element of theoretical background is the alignment of climate action with the development ambitions as expressed in the demand of co-benefits. Economic growth and social welfare in exposed areas of the Global South should also be fuelled by policies that lower

emissions and create resiliency. Climate action thus must not be perceived as an isolated action but rather be considered within a holistic development agenda promoting a socio-economic resilience. Such a combined strategy is in line with the Climate Justice model that emphasises the need to balance equity, capacity, and responsibility when it comes to climate action.

### **Methodology:**

The study design adopted is a qualitative secondary research design that will involve systematic review of the available literature, policy reports, and international agreements as far as relating to climate diplomacy in the Global South. The notion of qualitative approach is rooted in the fact that context-specific issues, such as climate justice, equity, and interactions between climate action and development must be examined (Cairney et al., 2023). A qualitative examination would be the most appropriate to expose thematic patterns and stories that are hidden in the discourse of climate diplomacy, particularly in the setting of the global south in the international climate negotiation processes. Analysis of secondary sources can help the study to create a broad body of professional opinion and case studies without bringing them to the field which would pose a logistical challenge. The given approach proves to be particularly helpful when we are discussing such abstract concepts as climate justice and historical responsibility that require much work with written sources, including treaties, conference reports, and scholarly articles.

The data analysis process has been taken to adopt a thematic analysis methodology. A common qualitative method is thematic analysis, as it provides an opportunity to identify common themes and patterns in a body of text (Altameemi & Altamimi, 2023). The thematic analysis in this paper is concentrated on such themes as equity and climate justice, finance and technology transfer, adaptation and resilience, and South-South cooperation. These are the themes that have been outlined as a result of a discussion of the major international accords, including the Paris Agreement and SDG 13, and backed up with peer-reviewed scholarly literature, policy reports, and NGO-based publications. This was done through an iterative analysis with the researcher having to first orient him/herself with the literature before coding the relevant excerpts according to the predefined thematic categories. This was an inductive process of coding as new themes were determined throughout the process and a deductive process of coding as the data were interpreted in terms of already existing frameworks such as CBDR.

In addition to this, the research is based on the Critical Theory lens (Drolet & Williams, 2022), especially the notion of climate justice, to analyse the ethical aspects of climate diplomacy in the Global South. The use of this framework is explained by the fact that it allows gaining insight into historical injustices of the developing countries in climate negotiations and emphasises the ethical imperative of a fairer allocation of duties and resources. Through critical lens, the paper criticises the power relations behind climate diplomacy giving a holistic picture of how global climate policies can be reconciled with development without further widening the existing inequalities. Such thematic analysis and Critical Theory methodological triangulation will make sure the complexities of climate diplomacy and its consequences to the Global South are viewed holistically.

### **Results**

#### ***Theme 1: Climate Finance and Capacity: Meeting the Needs of the Global South***

Climate change is a serious issue on a worldwide scale, especially in climate diplomacy, where there is a critical level of tension between industrialised countries and Global South (Buyuktan et al., 2023). This opposition is commonly depicted in situations when representatives of countries of the vulnerable islands demand to get even with the unfairness of the impact of pollution, whereas

industrialised countries insist on joint responsibility but refuse to assume complete responsibility regarding the past emission level (Modern Diplomacy, 2023). This dialogue captures the key paradox of climate diplomacy: the necessity to reconcile between the side that, in the past, caused the climate change and the side that suffered the greatest losses in the unpredictable consequences of climate change. In the case of developing countries in the Global South, it is a complicated task to balance the need to pursue short-term development priorities such as poverty alleviation, and economic growth with the need to fulfil climate commitments under the capacity of frameworks like the Paris Agreement and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal 13 (SDG 13) (Goodsite et al., 2016). SDG 13 demands immediate intervention on climate change to be done because this is one of the factors that weaken sustainable development and that climate action should be incorporated into national policies. The SDG 13 targets emphasise the necessity of not only taking climate action but also providing financial aid to the Global South so that it could achieve these goals (Goodsite et al., 2016).

The increasing awareness of the ability of climate change to turn back the gains of development is now a burning concern, particularly in the Global South where the effects of climate change are worsening poverty, hunger, and instability through hurricanes of intensified strength, years of droughts, and weather changes (Ciplet & Roberts, 2018). This stark fact highlights the inherent relationship between climate action and development whereby the attempt to develop clean energy and construct robust infrastructure can serve to limit climate change at the same time as these measures can lead to the accomplishment of associated SDGs, including SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy) and SDG 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure) (Hadsic, 2024). As a result, Global South countries have to increase their climate pledges but make sure that the pledges do not compromise current developmental goals. Such a need is related to the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), which recognises the fact that the responsibility of countries in fighting climate change is tied to the historical share of emissions produced and the ability to take action (Van Berkum, 2023). The present thematic analysis will investigate these challenges and the central themes to be examined encompass equity, financial support, adaptation, loss and damage, and South-South cooperation in the framework of balancing climate action with development targets under SDG 13 (UN South-South Cooperation, 2023). Bangladesh has been a world leader in using climate finance with its Climate Change Trust Fund which has been financing more than 800 adaptation and resilience projects since 2009 (Khatun & Al Kabir, 2023). With scarce resources, Bangladesh is an example of how national resources can be used to supplement international mechanisms to make sure that vulnerable populations get the support they need at the right time.

### ***Theme 2: Adaptation and Loss & Damage: Priorities for Resilience***

In the case of many Global South nations, the adaptation to changing climate and resilience to the damages that are already being inflicted is the most pressing climate issue rather than how they can reduce their (relatively low) emissions (Jayaram & Ajayan, 2022). Plans must be made to ensure infrastructure, agriculture, water and communities adapt to climate shocks in order to protect development gains. As an example, the government in Mozambique has had the Building Back Better housing scheme that was initiated after the cyclones, whereby the homes that were built are climate resistant, and this makes them less susceptible to future cyclones (Macamo, 2022). This demonstrates the direct protection of development progress by its adaptation policies. However, in the past, adaptation has been marginalised in climate negotiations in favour of mitigation (emissions reduction) measures. The developing countries have struggled to alter that,

so that adaptation and now loss damage become the priority on the global agenda, as per the holistic vision of SDG 13 (explicitly, resilience-building and reducing risk) (Jayaram & Ajayan, 2022).

It is focused on adaptation because the reality in countries throughout Africa, Asia, and small islands is becoming increasingly worse with droughts, floods, heatwaves, and hurricanes that are threatening lives and economic developments (Ruffini & Krasnyak, 2023). In the absence of adaptation, climate effects might drag millions of people back into poverty, flood health systems e.g. through disease transmission, and destroy key potentials such as agriculture and fisheries. Therefore, SDG 13.1 about enhancing the resilience and adaptive capacity is especially relevant to the Global South. The positive aspect is that most of the developing countries have prepared national adaptation plans or incorporated climate resilience by 2023 (Ruffini & Krasnyak, 2023). But this is limited by finance, as mentioned above since adaptation projects are funded at a fraction of the amount that mitigation is funded despite the fact that the amount of finance that is required is enormous, in the order of hundreds of billions a year by 2030. In climate diplomacy, the developing nations have always promoted a compromise between adaptation and mitigation initiatives. One of their major victories was the Paris Agreement where a goal on adaptation is included and adaptation activities are to be acknowledged and assisted (Dimitrov et al., 2019). Delegations of Global South emphasise that each bit of a degree of warming prevented by mitigation is a saving on the cost of adaptation, though on the other hand, even the existing amounts of warming demand emergency adaptation investments. This two-sided message of the necessity to have strong mitigation on the global scale as well as strong support of adaptation on the local scale has been one of the pillars of their negotiating platform.

One of the results of this advocacy is the realisation of specific channels of adaptation funding. The Adaptation Fund, which was initially attached to the Clean Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and now the Green Climate Fund (GCF) are now useful sources of funding adaptation programs in developing countries (Carr & Lesniewska, 2020). Nevertheless, the disbursement is slow, as compared to urgency, and access to such funds may be complicated. Consequently, adaptation finance has become one of the central themes of such forums as the Standing Committee on Finance of the UNFCCC and the new collective finance goal debates (Carr & Lesniewska, 2020). Developing nations would desire explicit assurances that a large portion of climate financing e.g. at least 50% will be allocated to adaptation. Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and LDCs, specifically, have taken a united front demanding this, as their vulnerability is extreme due to this (Kalaidjian & Robinson, 2022). Barbados has played a leading role in pushing for the operationalisation of the Loss and Damage Fund at COP27 (McDonnell, 2023). The Bridgetown Initiative, spearheaded by Prime Minister Mia Mottley, reframed global debates on debt relief and concessional finance, making small islands central actors in climate justice diplomacy. As one example, the Multidimensional Vulnerability Index is a proposed metric that SIDS have been championing to enable them redefine concessional finance eligibility beyond income level, and include climate vulnerability, such that more at-risk countries can access the support.

The importance of Loss and Damage fund is enormous. It recognises the fact that the victims of climate merit assistance, even when they did not contribute much to the vice. This is, therefore, its direct reflection of climate justice (Thomas et al., 2020). In the future, it will be to make sure that this fund is in fact filled with money current promises are low and that it brings aid to disaster-affected communities effectively. However, its presence is a diplomatic success that can make climate regime more on the side of vulnerable countries. By emphasising adaptation and L&D,

Global South countries are in effect saying that climate engagements pursuant to SDG 13 are not merely limited to making emission reductions; they are also about defending people and economies against climate effects. Climate resilience is vital in the development goals such as zero hunger, good health, and inequalities reduction (Thomas et al., 2020). In this way, constructing seawalls, early warning systems, drought-resistant agriculture, or post-disaster recovery funds is a subset of the climate agenda as much as solar panels or electric buses. Thematic efforts have also cropped up such as the Global Goal on Adaptation work program, and groups such as the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) a South-led forum on best practices and increasing demands on adaptation. To conclude, addressing loss and damage and prioritising adaptation are some of the primary methods through which the Global South is transforming climate diplomacy by making sure that their interests in development are not neglected (Leal-Arcas et al., 2021). These endeavours restate the claim that climate action should be inclusive of resilience and justice, not just of emissions measures. Developing countries seek to allocate resources and focus on such problems so that they can avoid being overwhelmed by the storms of climatic conditions and sink their ship of development.

***Theme 3: Aligning Climate Commitments with Development: Toward Sustainable Pathways***

Determining whether the developing countries have the ability to be able to develop on the foundation of low-carbon development and climate-resilient development without impacting the economic growth and social development is one of the most fundamental queries in climate diplomacy. There is an increasing trend of the Global South articulating the idea that the commitments to climate can be synchronized and even improved through appropriate strategies and assistance (Sarkodie et al., 2023). This is in accordance with SDG 13 that provides a climatic-friendly and sustainable development paradigm. The main element of this congruence is the pursuit of green growth whereby the majority of the developing states will be exploring ways of leaping directly to cleaner technologies as opposed to the traditional template of pollution-first and clean-up-later. Indicatively, certain countries like India have invested enormously in the field of renewable energy with the national solar mission leading to significant growth in the solar capacity in India. In 2015, India established the International Solar Alliance which currently has more than 110 countries that are members and they are encouraging the use of solar energy (Jha, 2021). This project shows that a Global South leader can both develop national renewable energy and influence climate negotiations on the international level.

The fact that India already attracted more than 10 billion in foreign direct investment in 2022 underlines how economic opportunities can be generated by climate endeavours (Jaumotte et al., 2024). Similarly, Kenya and Ethiopia have focused on geothermal and hydropower to meet the needs of energy sustainably, which proves that the mitigation measures, i.e., the development of renewable energy, also have co-benefits, i.e., reduced air pollution, improved health, and new industries to address SDGs 3 (health) and 8 (decent work) (Asia Society, 2023). The Olkaria geothermal station is currently the largest geothermal power station in the world, supplying more than 40 percent of the electricity used in Kenya, generating this power source with clean and renewable energy (Kong'ani & Kweyu, 2022). This does not only minimize the use of fossil fuels but it also enhances the energy security and the resiliency of Kenya.

The other major aspect of concern is climate-smart agriculture and land use that are essential to agrarian economies in the Global South. Such practices as drought-tolerant crops, better irrigation, and agroforestry do not only improve food security (SDG 2) but also develop climate shock resilience and sequester carbon (Tione et al., 2022). Such programs as the Africa Adaptation

Initiative encourage South-South exchange of knowledge in order to scale such practices (UN South-South Cooperation, 2023). The need to incorporate climate change in national development plans has become the norm in most Global South states following Target 13.2 of SDG 13. An example is where countries such as Rwanda and Vietnam have linked emission cuts and resilience to their economic planning. The latter change is reflected in more than 120 countries claiming that they are trying to change the national development plan to align with SDG 13 and the Paris agreement (Tione et al., 2022). Nevertheless, problems encountered in the implementation of these plans include lack of resources.

The story of climate action in the Global South is shifting to an opportunity rather than a burden story. The green growth has been feasible through technological advancement especially in the renewable energy sources. Rampa et al. (2020) add that the present state of scalable renewables makes reducing fossil-fuel dependence feasible and capable of stabilising economies and improving health. Decarbonisation of China has been facilitated by massive investments that it has made in the manufacture of renewable technologies, which have not only helped satisfy its needs but have also provided cheap clean technology to other developing nations. This type of South-South technology transfer can be much cheaper than Western one, strengthening energy sovereignty and proving the fact that climate-friendly development is not always associated with prohibitive costs (Rampa et al., 2020). Despite these changes, issues such as transition to fossil-based economies such as with the case of Nigeria and Indonesia where the workers are to be diversified and insured still remain. Just transition is the concept that underlies Global South diplomacy because climate efforts do not entrench inequalities.

#### ***Theme 4: Climate Diplomacy South-South Cooperation and Leadership.***

The rising leadership and collaboration among the Global South nations themselves is a major yet neglected facet of climate diplomacy. As the North-Southern relations, i.e. the relations between the developed and the developing countries, prevail in the climate discourse, South-South coalitions have gradually influenced the climate agenda. South-South cooperation has proved to be a tested approach to scaling climate solutions, with developing countries learning through the experience of others in developing renewable energy, climate-resilient agriculture, and management of disasters, through shared knowledge, technical expertise, and common negotiating positions (UN South-South Cooperation, 2023). G77+China, the alliance of more than 130 countries, has played a key role in climate negotiations, which include CBDR target. The Global South diplomacy has also been intensified by forming new coalitions, including BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) and the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), which can bring unity and diversity in the pursuit of climate justice (Rampa et al., 2020).

One of the recent changes in climate diplomacy is that the number of Global South countries that host major climate summits is on the rise. Since the COP22 in Morocco to the COP27 in Egypt, they have dominated the agenda, as the countries have made significant efforts in leading in renewable energy and loss and damage funds (Misik, 2021). Brazil, the host of COP30 in 2025, is on the forefront to stop deforestation in Amazon and to raise climate finance (Van Berkum, 2023). The Amazon Fund of Brazil, which has South-South alliances, has been redirecting billions into conservation and sustainable livelihoods of forest peoples (Uehara et al., 2023). It demonstrates the way the Global South leadership may integrate the ecological protection and the development co-benefit.

An excellent example of the growing agency of the Global South in climate governance is these South-South initiatives, and the transition of the Global South as a recipient of climate governance

to a leader in climate diplomacy. As China, with its manufacture of renewable technologies, enhances energy sovereignty by offering cheap clean technologies and transfers of technology among the South, clean energy solutions are offered at lower prices than conventional Western technologies (Van Berkum, 2023). The Belt and Road Initiative of China recently has also introduced a new aspect of the project, the green BRI, in which renewable energy projects, like solar parks in Pakistan and wind farms in Egypt, are being financed (Gu & Zhou, 2020). Through these projects, it can be seen that South-South investment is transforming the world energy landscape.

South-South solidarity will continue to be a strong force in climate negotiations despite internal divisions, including between small island states and large fossil-reliant countries. Developing countries often use their leaders to synchronise their views in multilateral arenas in support of equitable financial systems and equality. This increasing collaboration has turned the Global South into a key player in the climate negotiations, which underscores the necessity of inclusive transitions and sustainable climate solutions (UN South-South Cooperation, 2023). Going forward, the South-South leadership will have an even greater influence on the global climate action that is ambitious and equitable.

### **Conclusion**

This issue of climate diplomacy is the center problem since the Global South faces the responsibility of having to juggle the urgency to act against climate with the equal urgency to develop socio-economically. This is not a win-lose game, as the discussion has demonstrated: in case of reasonable policies and true international cooperation, the developing countries can pursue both goals at the same time without breaching their commitments of SDG 13 and Paris Agreement. This balance will be achieved, though, by anchoring the efforts in the area of justice, sufficient support, and inclusive leadership.

The global climate regime should be focused on climate justice and equity. The understanding of the different situations and historical obligations of the countries is not a weakness as it is one of the strengths that allow nations to act collectively. Developing countries are not trying to escape responsibility but on the contrary, they are trying to avoid new types of inequality when it comes to climate governance by insisting on equality. An essential element to this process is to keep rich countries responsible in the past emissions and unfulfilled commitments and at the same time demonstrate that climate and development aspirations are not opposing forces but can be mutually reinforcing.

The capacity of the Global South to enlarge ambition is largely subject to the financial and technological aid of the developed countries. Broken promises have already broken trust, and plausible financial promises and delivery can bring confidence and act as a greater motivator to perform. Solidarity is central both in the formation of new processes and mechanisms, including the Loss and Damage Fund, and the impetus towards mobilising trillions of climate finance by 2030. Reaching the yearly goal of 100 billion and more is not merely a financial accomplishment but also an indicator that third world countries would not have to make a decision between powering their homes and reducing carbon emissions.

Resilience and adaptation is as important as mitigation and the international structures are slowly acknowledging this fact. Weak states will not be able to trade in community resilience since it forms the basis of most SDGs, including poverty eradication, health, and infrastructures. The diplomatic success of the Loss and Damage Fund negotiated is a wakeup call, that perseverance works as it marks progress toward a more responsible and humanist climate regime. The real

challenge will be on whether vulnerable population will be able to rebuild and recover after the occurrence of future climate disasters with proper funding, transfer of knowledge and good institutions.

It is not just possible to reconcile development and climate action, but it is also more and more urgent. Climate measures are no longer a burden but a chance to modernise economies, to create new employment and to live better when considered as a part of national strategies. Low-carbon pathways can already contribute to energy security, population health and future prosperity, which many Global South states are already showing. Such experiences support the fact that sustainable development is the only viable development in the 21st century and the sooner all parties involved realize this fact the quicker they will make the progress.

The next generation of climate politics will probably be characterized by global South cooperation and leadership. With the changing western hegemony, developing nations have expressed the desire and ability to take the lead be it in hosting negotiations, forming alliances or coming up with their own locally developed solutions. The South–South alliances offer the platforms to enhance the concerns and make sure that development realities are mirrored in climate diplomacy. Quite on the contrary, this leadership gives a renewed drive to multilateralism by introducing voices that have never been heard to determine decision making.

In the future, the 2030 milestones and mid-century net-zero targets will challenge the determination of the world. The main question to the Global South is whether the world would leave the rhetoric and proceed with meaningful action that would ensure that the dual goals of development and climate resilience are achieved. As COP30 in Brazil draws closer, developing countries must come out with a believable vision of energy change, one that can benefit their citizens and at the same time protect the planet. This would reflect the SDG 13: urgent climate action that empowers all aspects of sustainable development

Finally, the issue of reconciliation between development and climate commitments is not only needless but also necessary. The Global South is inextricably connected with the global climate. Equity-blind climatic solutions will not win the backing of the people. What is needed is an inclusive, developmental, and justice-based diplomacy that is able to take the world to a sustainable and just future. The Global South can also play a more central role in influencing global action to ensure that climate action and development work towards the same direction through increased advocacy, innovation, and collaboration.

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