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The Impact of Emigration on Democracy in Pakistan

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Abstract

This study contributes to the literature on the political implications of emigration for sending countries. As migration generally flows from developing to developed countries, most existing studies highlight the positive political influence of liberal democratic states on non-democratic countries, transmitted through return migration or diaspora networks. Focusing on the case of Pakistan, this study highlights that emigrants can also transfer non-democratic norms and values from wealthy authoritarian states, such as those in the Middle East, to developing countries. Using time series methods, it examines the impact of emigration on democracy in Pakistan from 1972 to 2018. The Johansen Cointegration results revealed that emigration and democracy are cointegrated. Furthermore, the results from Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) indicated that democracy is negatively affected by emigration. Granger causality, established through the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), confirms a causal relationship between emigration and democracy. Overall, the findings suggest a long-term cointegration between the two, with emigration taking about 16 years to negatively impact democracy. These results confirm our initial presumption that emigration might have negative implications for democracy in Pakistan, as the majority of Pakistani emigrants have migrated to wealthy, authoritarian Middle Eastern countries.

Introduction

As the world is becoming a global village, transfer of humans, as well as ideas and values, across the borders is becoming widespread. Traditional studies explaining the phenomena of immigration focused on the effects of migration on both host (mainly advanced industrial) and home (mainly less developed) countries. Such studies primarily focused on the economic effects of migration. As the return migration started and advanced communication channels became available to diaspora populations, more recent studies also started explaining transfer of political ideas and values (mainly liberal democratic) to non-democratic countries. These studies generally assume that, compared to sending countries, ideas and values are superior in host countries. With the exception of studies such as Karakoç et al. (2016), most of

the literature deals with the transfer of democratic values and ideas to non-democratic states. Furthermore, to date no study exists that examines impact of emigration on Pakistani political institutions. This study fills this gap in the literature by examining transfer of both democratic and non-democratic ideas and values to Pakistan.

While the term immigration means an act of entering a country, ‘emigration’ refers to an act of ‘leaving a country.’ The mechanisms through which emigration can influence democracy and governance in home country include return migration, political remittances (or transfer of political norms and values), voting from abroad, economic contributions in political activities, and lobbying activities from abroad. Regarding diasporas, social networks and their connectedness with their friends and family back home are very important for the transfer of norms and values. The diffusion of these norms and values takes place through attitudinal change at individual level, joint action at community level, and institutional change at national level.

To explore the impact of emigration on politics (especially democracy) of home country, in this study we focus on the case of Pakistan. Pakistani case is important because emigration in Pakistan is a persistent and long-term phenomenon. Furthermore, Pakistani emigrants over the years have chosen both liberal democratic countries (mainly Western) and rich authoritarian states (such as oil-rich Arab countries). These dynamics of Pakistani emigration can help us see relative impact of democratic and non-democratic values and norms over the longer period of time. The time period covered in this study spans from 1971 to 2018, providing enough data to study long-term impact of emigration on Pakistani political system statistically.

Literature Review

International migration has become a significant phenomenon in recent years. In the period “[between] 970 and 2010 the number of international migrants more than doubled, from 81 million to 215 million” (Lu & Villarreal (2021, 2). This trend continued afterwards as well. In its 2019 report, Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) estimates that the number of international migrants has increased in all regions of the world, reaching 272 million mark by 2019. In 2019, international migrants were 3.5% of world population, compared to 2.8% in 2000. Regarding the major destinations of international migrants, Europe hosts largest number of 82 million migrants, followed by North America with 59 million migrants in 2019. North Africa and Western Asia stand at third place, hosting 49 million international migrants. In terms of countries, major developed countries such as US, UK, Germany, Canada and Australia, along with oil-rich Middle Eastern countries, such as UAE, Saudi Arabia, and other wealthy Arab states, attract most of the migrants. Among emigrant countries, from where migrants are moving out, India, China, and Mexico are at the top, followed by other, mostly developing, countries (United Nations, 2019). In Pakistan, total number of emigrants in 2019 was 563,018. Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Development’s estimates show that about 8.8 million Pakistanis live abroad, out of which majority, about 4.5 million, resides in the Middle East, followed by United Kingdom, with approximately 1.2 million citizens (Government of Pakistan, 2020).

Traditional literature on migration focused on positive or negative impact of migrants on the host countries, or immediate negative impact, especially in the form of economic or political brain-drain, on the origin countries. Regarding implications for home countries, different studies highlighted pernicious process that undermined political resources and vitality of sending societies (Lu & Villarreal, 2021, 4). Among the earliest such studies, Hirschman (1978) argued that when citizens dissatisfied with the political and social institutions of a state choose to leave, it can have negative consequences for the home country. Regarding political consequences, Hirschman’s exit-voice framework emphasized stymied voice due to exit or emigration.

Hirschman’s arguments were validated in more recent studies as well. Goodman & Hiskey (2008), for example, argued that, due to emigration, Latin American countries lost ‘risk-accepting’ individuals, who would have supported democratization processes. Furthermore, as economic remittances insulate families of emigrants from domestic economic crises, they are less likely to rely on government. This outcome overall reduces their interest in domestic politics, leading to the negative consequences for democratic reforms. Dancygier et al. (2022) also highlight negative political consequences of internal emigration in a set of advanced European countries, especially Sweden. These authors argue that through two mechanisms, compositional and preference-based, emigration resulted in the

success of populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe. They explain compositional mechanism as loss of young and motivated individuals due to emigration, leaving behind less educated and more ‘rooted’ individuals. This compositional change led to PRR success “without altering voting behavior.” Furthermore, voter preferences changed due to the departure of “individuals of prime working age who would have otherwise supported... a vibrant communal life” (Dancygier et al., 2022, 1), leading to “grievances on which populist parties capitalize[d]” (Dancygier et al., 2022, 2). Lu & Villarreal (2021) additionally find that ‘mass exodus’ leads to emigrants’ estrangement with local communities. These authors, however, find that low to moderate level of emigration leads towards greater participation in home country politics (Lu & Villarreal, 2021, 32).

Lu & Villarreal (2021) argue that the framework emphasizing negative consequences of emigration was “particularly relevant for understanding permanent, politically-driven emigration as well as emigration before the advent of modern communications when there were limited channels for long-distance interaction” (Lu & Villarreal, 2021, 4). Recent trends show long-term, especially positive, impact on origin countries. In the wake of these trends, recent theoretical and empirical literature examines the positive impact of emigration on the origin country.

While earlier studies highlighted emigrants as a valuable resource for economic development, recent study also focused on emigrants as potential agents for political development, especially promotion of democracy (Piper & Rother, 2015, p.6; Rüland et al., 2009). Such studies found that migration to countries with more advanced institutions leads to positive effects on the institutional development in the source countries (See, for example, Ammassari, 2004; Mercier, 2016; Barsbai et al., 2017; Li et al., 2017; and Rapoport, 2018). A number of studies, in particular, find that emigrants improve home country governance through remittance of pro-democracy political norms and behaviors (Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow, 2010; Pfütze, 2012; Chauvet & Mercier, 2014; Córdova & Hiskey, 2015; Escribà-Folch et al., 2022). Linking political remittances to shifts in political behaviors back home, such studies specifically highlight increased voter turnout (Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow, 2010; Córdova & Hiskey, 2015) and heightened political participation (Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow, 2010; Pfütze, 2012; Chauvet & Mercier, 2014; Córdova & Hiskey, 2015).

Among the studies highlighting positive impact of emigration, key argument in the literature is about return migration, or brain gain, which leads to a positive effect on the society and institutions of home country (Ammassari, 2004). Especially, return migrants provide strong channels through which home country institutions can be improved through the transfer of knowledge, ideas, and political norms from host country to origin country. In this respect, Pérez-Armendáriz & Crow (2010) found strong evidence in favor of emigrants strengthening democracy in Mexico. Their results of multiple regression model on the data of a nationwide public opinion poll conducted in June 2006 showed more democratic attitudes of return migrants, compared to those who never experienced migration. By comparing democratic institutions of host and home country, return migrants become more critical of home country political system. Batista & Vicente (2011) found strong positive relationship between emigration and political accountability and quality of public services through the mechanism of return migration. Their study was based on a single case study of Cape Verde, where they conducted tailored household survey from December 2005 to March 2006. Chauvet & Mercier (2014) also examined the political effects of return migrants in Mali during the municipal election in 2009. Using the OLS, 2SLS and fixed-effect model, these authors found that in 2009 local elections, a higher than usual level of turn out resulted due

the return of migrants. This study also revealed the effective transfer of norms from return migrants to non-migrants.

Literature on the emigration effect has also dealt with those emigrants who did not return to their countries of origin, but still managed to positively influence political institutions of the home countries (See Li et al., 2017; Barsbai et al., 2017; Rapoport, 2018). Emigrants can influence institutions of home country through lobbying activities in host countries (Shain & Barth, 2003; Lodigiani, 2016). Through such lobbying, they can influence host country to block or enhance financial aid, highlight lapses in human rights and democratic procedures, or to get their own right to vote or participate in elections as candidates. Shain & Barth (2003) further explain that emigrants get influence in host countries by achieving economic and political power, and then using this power to put pressure on home country, through their own host country or through international institutions, to achieve political accountability or seek overall reforms.

Dealing with the direct impact of diasporas, Lu & Villarreal (2021) argue that long-term migration does not prohibit emigrants from maintaining connections with home countries. Contemporary emigrants are in a best position to “generate ‘brain circulation’– ideational and material resources channeled from destination to origin societies–and act as agents of democratic diffusion” (Lu & Villarreal, 2021, 3-4). To further explain this phenomenon, these authors argue that democratic diffusion by emigrants is dependent on two conditions. One, continuous linkages back home; and, two, attitudinal and behavioral changes in emigrants owing to the exposure to the democratic norms and procedures in the host countries (Lu & Villarreal, 2021, 6-7).

Regarding type of political change in home countries, Pfutze (2012), using data from Mexican census of 2000-2002, employed an instrumental variable probit model to find that international migration increases the probability of an opposition party to win in a municipal election first time. Pfutze (2012) further argues that financial remittances by emigrants also affect quality of political institutions. In his view, financial remittances raise the disposable household income of diaspora’s families, leading to non-dependency on the government. Consequently, political clientalism in home country is weakened and patronage system is broken, leading to increased political accountability, as such households are more empowered to speak or vote against traditional political powers.

Batista et al. (2018) investigated the change in political behavior of emigrants’ family and friends back home in Mozambique. The data from household survey was collected from mid-September to November 2009. The results of the study suggest that emigrants’ networks increase political involvement and institutional development in home country by means of both information mechanism and motivation mechanism. In terms of political participation, Lodigiani & Salomone (2015) studied the role of diaspora individuals and their entities in promoting women participation in politics and found significantly positive effect of emigrant channels in increasing share of female participation in parliaments of home country, especially when conditions of female politics at host country are better than those at source country.

Coulibalya & Omgba (2017) focus on democratic transitions and significance of time. Using a sample of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries, Coulibalya & Omgba (2017) find a positive relationship between African emigration to the OECD countries during the 1970s and 1980s and their transition to democracy in the post-Cold War wave of democracy in the 1990s. Explaining this outcome, these authors argue that it takes time for emigrants to get settled in host country and start influencing democracy in the country of origin. The

mechanism through which emigrants influence democracy in their home countries is the establishment of civil society that is independent from the political system. Since it takes time to establish a civil society, these authors find that “the longer the duration of the emigrant population, the greater the impact on democracy, *ceteris paribus*” (Coulibaly & Omgba, 2017, 3).

Regarding impact on home country’s political development, significance of host country’s institutions, norms and values is also highlighted by different scholars. Chauvet et al. (2016), using a unique multi-sited exit-poll survey data of presidential election in Mali, Côte d’Ivoire and France, showed that differences in the perceptions and attitudes towards politics between migrant and non-migrant voters in Mali were depended on the institutional and political characteristics of host country, as well as emigrants’ interactions with those institutions. For example, highly educated Malian emigrants living in Côte d’Ivoire had a stronger interest in politics and were more likely to be part of a political party. Docquier et al. (2016) used data consisting a large sample of developing countries from 1985 to 2010 to show that openness to migration positively affects the institutional quality in migrants’ home country. The results were, however, destination-specific, meaning that only rich and strong democratic host countries played a significant role in positively shaping political landscape in developing countries.

Using the UNESCO statistical yearbook data of foreign students from 1950 to 2003 for 183 countries, Spilimbergo (2009) examined the relationship between foreign education and democracy in the origin country. He found no significant overall effect of total number of foreign students on origin country’s democracy, but found very strong correlation between the quality of host country’s democracy and domestic democracy, which increased as the strength of students abroad increased. In a similar study, Mercier (2016) looked into the migratory experience of political elites and its impact on the level of democracy’s evolution during the period of their leadership. The ‘Archigos’ database from 1960-2004 for developing states revealed that foreign educated political leaders from an autocratic state increased the score of Polity during their tenure of leadership. Mercier (2016) suggests that this outcome is a result of ‘preference shock’ related to the transfer of destination-specific political values and norms.

Tuccio et al. (2019) examined the transformation of social and political norms through migration and its association with political results in origin country, Morocco. Using the Investigation on the Impact of International Migration on Development in Morocco (IIMD) dataset, which is based on a survey conducted in 2013, these authors find positive impact of return migrants (from Western states) on demand for social and political change, while they find opposite results for return migrants from Arab countries. These results suggest that quality of host countries’ institutions matters in affecting origin country’s institutions.

Karakoç et al. (2016) look at the socialization of immigrants under authoritarian cultures and political institutions. Like in democratic countries, immigrants were found to acquire norms and values of those societies and transmitted them to their home countries through their social networks back home. This phenomenon led to surprise election results in 2011-2012 Egyptian parliamentary elections in which Islamist conservative party, the Nour, emerged as the second strongest part, gaining 25% of the seats. Based on the public opinion survey of 1100 individuals, soon after elections (in January 2012), these authors found that the surprising success of the Nour party was mainly result of Egyptian emigration to Saudi Arabia. In their words, “socialization in a nondemocratic context may also instill

nondemocratic norms and values and lead to increased support for parties that are not committed to democratic values” (Karakoç et al. 2016, 732).

To conclude this section, we can refer to the core arguments of Rapoport’s (2016) study. Explaining the phenomenon of ‘political remittances,’ Rapoport (2016) argues that migrants absorb new political ideas, practices, and attitudes in host countries that change their own political views which, in turn, are transmitted to their home communities through social contacts with friends and families back home. According to Rapoport (2016), two insights are important in this respect. First, “‘destination matters:’... depending on where they [emigrants] are, they will remit different norms and values.” Second, “‘timing matters:’ it takes time for individual preferences to evolve, and even more time for these preferences to be transferred and digested by recipients in the home countries” (Rapoport, 2016, 1).

In the following, we will empirically study core dynamics of emigration by focusing on the Pakistani case. Pakistan’s case is unique in a sense that majority of Pakistani emigrants have chosen authoritarian Middle Eastern countries, while almost equal number of emigrants went to the Western democratic countries. Furthermore, emigration in Pakistan is a long-term phenomenon. Starting in late 1960s and early 1970s, emigration still does not show any sign of abating. Data on Pakistani emigration can provide especially valuable insights into the assumptions concerning the timing and impact of destination-specific emigration on Pakistan’s democratic processes.

Data

This study employs time series data spanning the period 1971-2018 for Pakistan. The data for the variable of *Democracy* is taken from the data set of POLITY IV. The Polity IV project provides measures of democratic and autocratic authority characteristics in national governments. Its indicators, including the composite Polity2 index (ranging from -10 to +10), evaluate the openness of political systems by considering factors such as the presence of channels for citizens to effectively voice opinions on policies and leaders, the degree of institutional limitations on executive power, and the safeguarding of civil liberties in everyday life and political participation.

The data for number of emigrants (*no. of emigrants*) from Pakistan is obtained from Bureau of Emigration & Overseas Employment, Government of Pakistan from 1971 to 2018. The data for control variables such as GDP per capita (*GDPPC*), Foreign Direct Investment (*FDI*), Foreign official development assistance (*foreign aid*), human capital (*tertiary education*), *population* and trade openness (*trade*) are taken from World Development Indicators (WDI).

Models specified

To investigate the long-term impact of emigration on democracy, the current study employs Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) model. The FMOLS technique is chosen for its ability to yield reliable estimates, particularly with smaller datasets, and for its robustness. It was originally developed and refined by Philips & Hansen (1990).

FMOLS is designed to estimate a single cointegrating relationship involving variables integrated of order one [I(1)]. We used ADF and Philips Perron tests (unit root tests) to investigate the order of integration of each I(d) sequence of variables included in equations.

Furthermore, Johansen (1988, 1991) co-integration method, based on the use of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models is employed to examine cointegration between variables of the model. Finally, to determine the direction of long-run causality between variables and the speed of their convergence towards equilibrium, a vector error correction model (VECM), is employed in this study. The regression equation for emigration's impact on the democracy of Pakistan is:

$$\begin{aligned} Democracy_t = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 no.of\ Emigrants_t + \beta_2 tertiary\ education_t + \beta_3 lnGDPPC_t \\ & + \beta_4 population_t + \beta_5 Trade_t(\%GDP) + \beta_6 FDI_t(\%GDP) \\ & + \beta_7 Foreign\ aid_t + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned}$$

Results

We conducted a multi-step analysis, beginning with tests to determine whether the variables are stationary at first difference. This was followed by cointegration testing to establish the presence of a long-term relationship. Subsequently, the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) method was applied to examine the causal effect of emigration on democracy. Finally, the feedback effect was analyzed using a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM).

Unit root tests

The unit root tests, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Table 1) and Phillips-Perron test (Table 2), were conducted with individual intercept and trend for each dependent and independent variable at both level and first difference.

Table 1: Augmented Dickey Fuller test

Variables	Level		First difference	
	Intercept	Intercept and trend	Intercept	Intercept and trend
Democracy	-2.127	-2.297	-4.539***	-4.567***
No. of Emigrants	-3.472***	-	-4.605***	-4.683***
Tertiary Education	-1.753	-1.893	-6.226***	-6.352***
GDPPC	-0.564	-1.924	-3.007**	-2.949
Population	-3.081**	-0.270	-1.337	-3.434**
Trade (%GDP)	-2.577*	-2.738	-5.158***	-5.203***
FDI (%GDP)	-2.819*	-3.288*	-4.329***	-4.318***
Foreign Aid	-2.288	-	-7.423***	-7.397***

***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Table 2: Phillips Perron test

Variables	Level		First difference	
	Intercept	Intercept and trend	Intercept	Intercept and trend
Democracy	-2.063	-2.155	-6.336***	-6.296***
No. of Emigrants	-3.423	-3.224	-4.544 ***	-4.830***
Tertiary Education	-1.812	-2.322	-7.951 ***	-7.981***
GDPPC	0.009	-1.538	-5.715 ***	-5.655***
Population	-6.175	3.491	-0.557	-2.722
Trade (%GDP)	-4.047***	-4.177***	7.893***	-7.900***
FDI (%GDP)	-2.246	-2.428	-4.732***	-4.693***

Foreign Aid	-2.092	-	-8.141***	-8.087***
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***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.

Results of the unit root tests show that most of the variables are non-stationary at level, but all are stationary at 1st difference at least in ADF test, which fulfills the pre-condition for Johansen Cointegration test. Now we can test Johansen Cointegration.

Cointegration test

To determine the existence of long-run relationship between variables, we test 'Johansen Cointegration'. Table 3 present the results of Cointegration test.

Table 3: Johansen Cointegration test – Democracy

Null Hypothesis	Trace Statistic	Critical Value (5%) -	Max-Eigenvalue Statistic	Critical Value (5%) -
$r = 0$	231.94	156.00	63.82	51.42
$r \leq 1$	168.12	124.24	45.20*	45.28
$r \leq 2$	122.92	94.15	37.66	39.37
$r \leq 3$	85.27	68.52	26.76	33.46
$r \leq 4$	58.51	47.21	22.99	27.07
$r \leq 5$	35.52	29.68	20.16	20.97
$r \leq 6$	15.36 *	15.41	13.27	14.07
$r \leq 7$	2.09	3.76	2.09	3.76

The trace test statistics in Table 3 show 7 cointegrating equations at 5 % level assuming two lags in the test equation, indicated by '*' with 48 number of observations.

The Maximum-Eigen test at $r=0$ is 63.82, which is greater than the critical value of 51.42, so we can reject the null hypothesis ($r=0$, means no cointegrating equation). At $r \leq 1$, the trace statistics are 45.20 which is less than critical value, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis ($r \leq 1$, means there is 1 cointegrating equation). Since the Maximum-Eigen test is more appropriate than the trace statistic test, this study relies on the Maximum-Eigen test.

Results of the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS)

As the cointegration is confirmed among the variables in all the variable, we can estimate the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Square (FMOLS) to analyze the long-run cointegration relationship between dependent and independent variables. The results of FMOLS are presented in Table 4. These results corroborate earlier findings.

Table 4: Fully Modified OLS Estimates

Variables	Dependent Variable
	Democracy
No. of Emigrants	-4.554*** (0.818)
Tertiary Education	-2.984* (1.772)
GDPPC	52.34*** (16.66)
Population	-19.37 (12.66)
Trade (%GDP)	0.266* (0.142)
FDI (%GDP)	-2.052*** (0.698)
Foreign Aid	4.405*** (1.477)
Observations	46

***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. All independent variables are in logged form except Trade and FDI.

Vector Error Correction Model

Following the confirmation of cointegration among the variables, the final step involves examining the presence and direction of causal relationships. To achieve this, Granger causality tests within a vector error correction model (VECM) framework are conducted. When variables are cointegrated, a VECM-based Granger causality analysis is appropriate as it accounts for both short-run causality (assessed through F-statistics) and long-run causality (determined by the lagged error correction term). The VECM inherently incorporates the identified cointegrating relationships, ensuring that the endogenous variables tend to converge towards their long-run equilibrium while also capturing short-term fluctuations. Consequently, the estimated error correction terms directly indicate the speed at which a dependent variable adjusts back to its equilibrium following changes in other variables. The findings from the VECM analysis are detailed in Table 5.

Our analysis indicates a long-run relationship and causal link between the number of emigrants and democracy. The error correction term (ECT) coefficient, valued at -0.069 and significant at the 1% level, suggests that the dependent variable adjusts towards equilibrium at a rate of 6.9% annually. This suggests that the transformation of democracy in Pakistan, in response to the set of integrated independent variables including our main variable of interest, the number of emigrants, takes approximately 16 years. The results of the VECM indicate that emigration has long-run effect on political institutions in Pakistan. Impact of emigration on democracy in Pakistan is slow and it takes time for convergence.

Conclusion

Results of the study overall confirm that emigration in Pakistan did influence democracy in Pakistan. However, this impact was negative as well as slow and long-term. On average, it takes about 16 years for emigration to impact democracy in Pakistan. Regarding negative result, the study confirms our initial hunch that as majority of Pakistani emigrants choose authoritarian states, they bring back or remit authoritarian norms and values. This result addresses the main query regarding the combined effect of democratic and non- democratic norms and values on Pakistani democracy. Being in majority, emigrants from authoritarian states were more effective in transmitting non-democratic norms and values.

Although this study does not deal with the exact causes of the above outcome, a few suggestions can be made. First, initial waves of emigration in Pakistan took place in early 1970s, when a number of unskilled workers from Pakistan left for oil-rich Middle Eastern countries following the boom in oil prices. These less educated emigrants were more likely to accept authoritarian norms and values uncritically. Second, and related to the first, Islamic

Table 5: VECM based on Granger Causality test results

Dependent Variables	Sources of Causality								
	Short-run					Long-run			
	Δ Democracy	Δ No. of Emigrants	Δ Tertiary Education	Δ GDPPC	Δ Population	Δ Trade (%GDP)	Δ FDI (%GDP)	Δ Foreign Aid	ECT
Δ Democracy	NA	2.239	1.443	-11.346	-18.080	0.235	2.192	2.891	- 0.069** *
	(0.164)	(2.039)	(2.130)	(34.993)	(94.612)	(0.223)	(1.500)	(2.482)	(0.031)
Δ No. of Emigrants	-0.002	NA	-0.100	-1.725	2.609	0.018	0.104	-0.118	0.008
	(0.011)		(0.138)	(2.263)	(6.118)	(0.014)	(0.097)	(0.161)	(0.002)
Δ Tertiary Education	-0.020*	-0.230	NA	-3.207	5.600	-0.003	-0.024	0.237***	-0.002
	(0.012)	(0.152)		(2.608)	(7.051)	(0.017)	(0.112)	(0.185)	(0.002)
Δ GDPPC	-0.001	-0.007	-0.009	NA	-0.029	0.001	0.005	-0.014	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.010)		(0.462)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.000)
Δ Population	-0.000	0.000	0.001	-0.001	NA	0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.019)		(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Δ Trade (%GDP)	0.174	0.182	-0.195	24.747	67.703	NA	0.253	-0.323	-0.001
	(0.113)	(1.408)	(1.470)	(24.156)	(65.311)		(1.035)	(1.714)	(0.021)
Δ FDI (%GDP)	-0.029*	-0.158	0.032	10.876***	-9.336	0.016	NA	0.253	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.208)	(0.217)	(3.564)	(9.635)	(0.023)		(0.253)	(0.003)
Δ Foreign Aid	0.005	0.520***	0.686***	-2.644	-6.242	0.043***	-0.020	NA	-0.012
	(0.010)	(0.124)	(0.130)	(2.135)	(5.772)	(0.014)	(0.091)		(0.002)

***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors in parenthesis. All independent variables are in logged form except Trade and FDI.

identity of the Middle Eastern states also helped these emigrants to absorb political and cultural values of the Middle Eastern states. Third, start of war in Afghanistan in 1979 prompted a number of Middle Eastern migrants to come to Pakistan and bring their norms and values. Due to these processes, Pakistani society became more receptive to the Middle Eastern norms and values. Overall, Pakistani society was a fertile ground for authoritarian norms and values throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Things started to change in the early 1990s due to two main reasons. One, following collapse of the Soviet Union, democracy was established as a legitimate form of government in the world. Two, conclusion of war in Afghanistan and restoration of democracy in Pakistan shifted the trend in favor of democratic norms and values. Future research could empirically investigate these propositions to better understand the underlying causes of emigration's negative impact on Pakistan's political institutions.

Regarding policy implications of this study, insights from Rapoport (2016) are particularly useful. According to Rapoport (2016), autocratic governments, such as those of China (until the 1990s), the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, and Venezuela, have traditionally implemented restrictive emigration policies to prevent transfer of democratic norms and values. Conversely, receiving countries like the U.S. have established visiting and exchange programs to facilitate the transmission of democratic norms and values to authoritarian states (Rapoport 2016, 6).

Rapoport's (2016) insights are primarily based on literature that emphasizes the democratic dividend of emigration resulting from migration from non-democratic to democratic countries. Now as we have established that non-democratic values can also be transmitted, we can assume that authoritarian governments might encourage their emigrants to choose other authoritarian states, instead of democratic ones. On the hand, democratic governments might do the exact opposite. Based on these insights, we can argue that democratic forces in any country might encourage emigration to liberal democratic states, while more authoritarian forces might encourage emigration to non-democratic states.

Assuming that democratic norms and values are superior political values, we can recommend that Pakistani government should encourage emigration to liberal democratic states and facilitate the transmission of political remittances from these countries. Emigration to such countries can be encouraged by negotiating bilateral agreements with democratic countries and by developing the skills of potential emigrants that are in demand in these destinations. Political remittances can be encouraged by involving diaspora communities in Pakistani political institutions and by granting them voting rights.

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