

Received : 20 June 2024, Accepted: 15 July 2024

## **External Political Issues and Opposition Dynamics in Pakistan (1988–1990)**

**Muhammad Rizwan Tahir<sup>1</sup>, Usman Ali <sup>2</sup>, Sundas Sumaira<sup>3</sup>, Dr Mehnaz Begum<sup>4</sup>,  
Iqra Kanwal <sup>5</sup>, Muhammad Asif (Corresponding Author)<sup>6\*</sup>**

1.M.A, International Relations and Security Studies, University of Bradford, United Kingdom. [Rizwantahir278@gmail.com](mailto:Rizwantahir278@gmail.com)

2.PhD Scholar, History, Government College University Faisalabad–Pakistan. [Aliusman2400@outlook.com](mailto:Aliusman2400@outlook.com)

3.Lecturer, Pakistan Studies, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan. [chatthaahmad019@gmail.com](mailto:chatthaahmad019@gmail.com)

4.Lecturer, Sharia and Law Department, Islamia College University Peshawar, Pakistan. [Peshawar.mehnaz@icp.edu.pk](mailto:Peshawar.mehnaz@icp.edu.pk)

5.Lecturer, Pakistan Studies, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan. [Iqrakanwal902@gmail.com](mailto:Iqrakanwal902@gmail.com)

6\*.Lecturer, Pakistan Studies, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, Pakistan. [muhammadasif33370@gmail.com](mailto:muhammadasif33370@gmail.com)

### ***Abstract***

*This study examines the centre–province relations in Pakistan during 1988–1990, focusing on the political confrontation between the federal Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the IslamiJamhooriIttehad (IJI)–led provincial governments, particularly in Punjab and Balochistan. It highlights how institutional mechanisms like the Council of Common Interests (CCI) and the National Economic Council (NEC) were rendered ineffective due to political polarisation, executive interference, and mutual distrust. Key areas of conflict included fiscal allocations, provincial autonomy, control over state media, and development projects such as the Kalabagh Dam and Sui Gas royalties. The study also examines the role of coalition politics, caretaker governments, and the discretionary powers of the presidency under Article 58(2)(b), which facilitated the dismissal of elected governments. Findings suggest that political rivalry, weak institutional norms, and adversarial behaviour between the federal and provincial actors obstructed democratic consolidation. The article concludes that sustained centre–province disputes, compounded by elite-driven conflicts, significantly undermined parliamentary democracy and contributed to political instability in Pakistan.*

**Keywords:** Centre–Province Relations; Federalism in Pakistan; IslamiJamhooriIttehad (IJI); Pakistan People’s Party (PPP); Coalition Politics; Provincial Autonomy; Democratic Instability

**Introduction:**

1988 referendum gave political party break mandate. Few are able to gain a majority. A majority of the independent candidates came back to the assemblies. The two popular IJI and PPP winners were unable to gain a simple majority and sought to gain sympathy and support from individual candidates, opponent party members<sup>1</sup> and representatives of minor parties in NA and regional legislatures. Efforts to be sponsored by two big winners of the 1988 elections by the independents have made the potential course of political changes biased on democratic principles. The vote of the common peoples was neglected and a history of non-accommodative behaviour towards political rivals was resurrected once again. Big winner's pessimistic attitude sowed a seed of distrust between the federal government and the Punjab and Balochistan provincial government that was evident during the first term of Benazir's premiership. (Hassan, 1990)

The IJI won a majority of the provincial assemblies of Punjab and NWFP. It did not achieve fair success in NA and Sindh and Balochistan's PAs, but the loss was not acknowledged. On 23 November 1988, a closed door conference of the heads of IJI member parties was held to devise potential policy. It was resolved to make every attempt to gain support from independent MNAs, MPAs, and regional parties such as JUI (F) in Balochistan and MQM in Sindh to establish government at national level. The demands of the MQM were also addressed by IJI leadership. JMP's PirFazal claimed that IJI was entitled to shape government as it won in the country. JUI-D and Junejo declared their full support and cooperation for Nawaz Sharif if he rendered government at the Center and/or in the provinces. (Din, 1998)

The leaders of the IJI have shown willingness to recognise Maulana Fazal as a joint nominee for the PM office to hold PPP out of power. Syeda Abida Hussain was nominated as a possible candidate for the speaker race. Until Benazir's election as PM unit was evident within IJI ranks, as he had to fight against a common foe. The election of Benazir as PM shifted the course of political changes to come. Many independents channelled their support to PPP. IJI leaders such as Ghafoor, Jatoi and Qazi saw the PM's election as a promising launch for the PPP. For opposition leader and parliamentary head of the NA alliance, the obvious 263 option was Nawaz Sharif, but he chose to stay in the Punjab Assembly in view of the political progress. Being a big coalition, IJI also had to contend with its internal problems. It had to establish consensus on those topics which will be

addressed in depth later. Most of IJI's influential figures missed the vote. Jatoi, convener of the IJI, also lost the general elections after losing the by-elections fought from the hometown of Khar. Junejo, president of PML, After losing the elections, he declared that PML would be reorganised to boost its results. This announcement created uncertainty about the future of IJI because Junejo, dismissing IJI, proposed working on the PML manifesto at numerous times at party meetings for its reorganisation. He also pointed to the constitution of the party that one individual could not hold simultaneous government and party offices. This announcement launched a new period of tensions and confrontation between Junejo and Nawaz Sharif who had apprehensions about party elections and about the implementation of party constitution. Chairman Senate selection also became contentious. Nawaz Sharif decided to name MahbubulHaq as Senate Chair. (Bukhari, 2004)

So he did not attend the PML meeting to finalise Wasim Sajjad's nomination. Faced with certain problems within the coalition, it was not easy for IJI leadership to form a government or deal with issues with a powerful opposition at the Core. Just a strong political competition with the PPP has held things together. These controversies in NWFP did not encourage the IJI to enter government even though IJI had won more seats than any other party. Government building in the provinces is a long tale of IJI's internal issues and its conflicts with its main political competitor, the PPP.

### **Government Formation in the Provinces**

Government creation in the provinces hasn't been straightforward. IJI and PPP have faced a lot of challenges. Ghulam Ishaq Khan refused the PM's candidacy for a long time in a judicious manner and gave all the big election winners enough time to prove their support and created a lot of controversy. (Askari, 1988) These disputes remained unanswered until Benazir's first term as PM was done. The following pages address the creation of Governments in the provinces. A controversy over the removal of the government of Balochistan is also addressed to illustrate the stance of the federal government towards the IJI, which culminated in the turbulent two-year span of the Center and the provinces that eventually led to the abolition of the NA and all four provincial assemblies in August 1990.

Government forming at the Punjab has not been a smooth IJI sailing. PPP tried its hardest to shape government in Pakistan's largest province but struggled to level off charges of corruption against IJI leadership. The order for Governor Punjab Makhdoom Sajjad Hussain Qureshi to delay convening the Punjab PA session was a very first measure toward Nawaz Sharif. This was done just to take some time to form government in the Punjab but the governor did not prolong the process and Nawaz Sharif was elected as CM Punjab. Then she asked him to defer the oath of Nawaz Sharif as CM. This was done even before Benazir took the oath as Pakistan's PM. She later named General (Retd) Tikka Khan as Punjab Governor making matters more controversial. (Hashmi, 1988a)

The PPP has pursued a strategy of conflict with the Punjab IJI administration. It alleged that Nawaz Sharif, who is part of the caretaker administration, rigged elections in particular constituencies. It also said that Nawaz Sharif had invested huge amounts of money to buy independent members' cooperation and kept them in confinement in a resting house in Changa Manga, near Lahore, until the Punjab PA meeting day for CM election on December 2, 1989.

To destabilise the Punjab IJI administration, many of the PPP's influential leaders came to Punjab and sought to buy loyalties from IJI MPAs. To pressurise Nawaz Sharif, the federal government even moved high-ranking officials from bureaucracy. No-confidence moves against CM and the Speaker have also been used as intimidation weapons. The other portion of this chapter addresses specifics of these moves. All of PPP leadership's "revengeful" actions increased Nawaz Sharif's prominence which was evident in IJI's victory in the by-elections. This proved a big setback for PPP. The other portion of this chapter addresses specifics of these moves. All of PPP leadership's "revengeful" actions increased Nawaz Sharif's prominence which was evident in IJI's victory in the by-elections. This proved a big setback for PPP. (Nasir, 1990)

Government building in the province of Balochistan was a problem facing victorious parties. To make peace with others, neither of the parties won a large plurality. IJI and JUI (F) formed a committee to explore the possibilities of participating in the forming of government or to appoint a popular opposition leader. Zaffarullah Khan Jamali (Jamali), Bugti and JUI were all CM office contestants. The IJI leadership has sought to use this situation to its benefit. The central leadership of the IJI had its own proposals for which

Nawaz Sharif, as its emissary, sent Vardag to Bugti. He provided assistance to Bugti, to become CM Balochistan. In return he asked Nawaz Sharif for help in NA for PM election. The surprising thing about this was that all this briefing was given to IJI provincial chief Jamali without proper knowledge. With support from IJI and ANP, speakers and deputy speakers were elected unopposed before CM was elected. Speaker Sardar Mohammad Khan Barozai Belongs to PPP. Later Jamali was elected with the casting vote of speaker as CM Balochistan. To reinforce his position Jamali compromised with PPP, the ardent opponent of IJI and PML. Through his own reasoning he explained his act. Group politics did not work in Balochistan according to him, so it was better to work in collaboration with all the parties. (Naqvi, 1989)

Jamali's election via Speaker's casting vote was found by Bugti to be unconstitutional. With JUI's support or any other possibility to get him fired from the office, he decided to file no-confidence motion against him. Jamali and JUI had already agreed to work with each other. It was determined that JUI would support Jamali as CM, and that Jamali would support the election of a Balochistan Governor, appointed by JUI.

MaulanaFazal denied the existence of any such deal as he was occupied with both Jamali and Bugti in negotiations. A declaration of reconciliation between Bugti and JUI altered the Balochistan's political realities. Meanwhile, the defection of one of the provincial ministers turned the absolute majority of Jamali into a minority and he requested the governor to disband the PA of Balochistan only after 15 days of its creation. Governor acted directly upon CM's advice and on December 15, 1988, disbanded the PA in Balochistan. Jamali justified himself by claiming that for the sake of political peace in Balochistan, he called for the dissolution of the assembly for a fresh mandate. The divided mandate could never help create a cohesive regional government that could be an obstacle to the province's success and he was only seeking to prevent that. Jamali said it was a must to pass the provincial budget before December and he was met with a non-serious attitude of MaulanaFazal's shifting stances, which prompted him to take an early decision to dissolve the assembly. He said that PML and IJI's central high command did not respond to him properly as he tried to communicate, so he took a solo flight when making a decision on the dissolution. In his argument, inconsistency is clear. And if it succeeded will the PA approve the budget. Dissolution was supposed to take three months to re-elect and return to the legislature. If Jamali takes the initiative for the citizens of the

province he might step down to elect such a majority CM. The other fact that Jamali was elected by Speaker's casting vote seems more true, he was sure he could not get the vote of confidence for which he wanted to dissolve the assembly. Balochistan PA disbandment got a mixed reaction. There have been accusations and counter-allegations against one another by the federal government and IJI. Many found it political competition between PPP and IJI and others called it a practise to overthrow the Punjab government. In addition, some associated the incident with ZAB's 1973 dismissal of the Balochistan Government. PML leadership responded to the dissolution decision by cancelling Jamali's membership of PML. IJI could not build agreement to respond unanimously on dissolution. In addition, some associated the incident with ZAB's 1973 dismissal of the Balochistan Government. PML leadership responded to the dissolution decision by cancelling Jamali's membership of PML. IJI could not build agreement to respond unanimously on dissolution. (Awan, 1991)

The Federal Government took a radically different stance. It took it as a concern for the provinces. Before its execution, Benazir declared that she had not been told of the decision. She kept Eighth Amendment accountable for this dissolution but at the same time found it a legitimate gesture. She requested the members of the dissolved assembly to go to court or vote for fresh elections. Attracted backlash from this comment. There was an argument that the assembly was dissolved with PM's approval but she said she was not informed of the governor's act to maintain her political reputation intact. (Shahid, 1989a)

In an interview, Nawaz Sharif claimed that Jamali decided to enter government with the help of the PP and with the advice of a federal minister; he took the decision to dismantle the PA. He found it ridiculous that when the governor signed the order when he was in Islamabad the federal government was unaware of the developments. Benazir's stance showed she wasn't seeking to save the assembly dissolution as Jamali was an IJI official and he might be made accountable for the dissolution. At the Centre, this had no damage to PPP or its government. PM said Governor Musa Khan did not belong to PPP, so she was not responsible for his behaviour. MS. Tahira Khan, MPA Punjab, was of the opinion that if the act was mysterious to the PM she would be unable to run the state and if she understood the drama she would be insincere with the nation and more importantly with democracy. She said the Punjab governor and three chief auditors have been fired directly after Benazir entered PM's office. She considered Governor Musa a right person to

materialise her proposals so she was not dismissed. It was also a well-known fact that Jamali and Governor Musa belonged to IJI but they were also in regular touch with the federal government. Some assumed that the whole episode of separation was prepared with Federal Government instructions.(Hussain, 1989)

Bugti opposed the dissolution on the recommendation of a CM, who had been chosen by the casting vote of the speaker and still had not obtained the vote of confidence. Bugti decided to restore the assembly with the help of JUI and Pakistan MilliAwamiIttehad (PashtoonKhwa Quetta) (PMAI) for which constitutional petitions were lodged in high court in Balochistan. The IJI leadership did not neglect the legal implications of the dissolution as well. It even opposed the court's dismissal. On January 23, 1989, the high court of Balochistan ordered the Assembly to be reinstated, finding its dissolution unconstitutional. On February 5, 1989, Akbar Bugti took the oath as Balochistan's new CM heading an alliance of BNA-JUI-IJI-PMAI with the help of 33 MPAs in the house of 44.

There was hope the newly elected government would solve the common people's problems. Things changed initially when the government revived the colleges that had been closed for quite a while. But the election of PNP chief, Mir GhousBakshBizenjo as Balochistan governor began a discussion about the worsening of Centerprovince relations. Bugti's call to summon the CCI meeting to restore regional privileges under the 1973 constitution strengthened the restrictions that had long been there.

Balochistan PA was reinstated by the high court of Balochistan which was taken as a surprise as BNA and JUI-F were anticipating fresh elections and during their protest against the abolition of Balochistan they actually began their election campaign but most of the winners of the 1988 elections did not want fresh elections. Many national parties haven't needed fresh votes either. IJI MPAs had won a majority thanks to the biradri scheme and family affiliations. There were chances that their loyalties changed towards PPP or challenge as independents. JUI had captured a slim majority in several seats and was afraid to if the election was held again, fail to BNA. BNA was the only party that wished to maintain or boost its seats in the PA. Hence the establishment of the assembly was a promising step for IJI and JUI. BNA could strengthen its position in the event of fresh elections that could prove beneficial for the development of the region, but things

remained largely smooth until the assembly was disbanded in August 1990.(SAARC-NGO Observers, 1995)

IJI gained more seats than any other party in the 1988 NWFP elections but failed to gain a simple majority to enter government. Gen. (retd) Fazal-e Haq, NWFP's IJI chairman, struggled to attract ANP and other influential parties in support. He wanted to quit the NWFP PA himself and kept his seat in the NA which made it tougher for IJI. Haq's departure from NWFP PA has created a leadership void. In that case, HumayunSaifullah has been nominated for the CM office in NWFP as IJI candidate. PPP had asked IJI to form a regional coalition government. After debating it with the IJI leadership Haq opposed the proposal, and PPP established government in the then NWFP with the help of ANP. Problems for IJI improved as ardent Leaguers like ArbabJehangir co-operated with PPP. AftabSherpao became the province's CM. The PPPANP coalition government was unable to survive for a longer period of time as PPP refused to meet the agreements reached with ANP. Among the most popular was the position of governor, appointed by ANP.

IJI, after the PPP-ANP coalition was dissolved, worked out some working arrangement with ANP in the then NWFP PA to undermine the PPP government. One interesting point that was clear was the specifics of the IJI-ANP partnership that had been debated before its launch. There was no leader of IJI, IJI forward bloc and the independent MPAs in the then NWFP PA in the press conference. This raised questions about the new coalition but Nawaz Sharif dismissed the presence of any issues among the allied parties. The IJI and ANP representatives reacted to this parliamentary opposition alliance in a mixed manner. The IJI-ANP alliance was deemed dysfunctional as they had theological differences. The motto of IJI's election was 'Islamisation' while ANP believes in liberal politics. IJI's foreign policy was focused on India and Russia's enmity but ANP believed in peace with them. They also had opposing opinions regarding the crisis in Afghanistan.(Burki, 1989)

IJI opposed the appointment of an ANP governor in the NWFP, finding it detrimental to the war in Afghanistan. The IJI and the ANP both explicitly declared that they would not change their position in Afghanistan. In line with their previous actions, the IJI-ANP alliance welcomed both political critics and supporters to criticise.

IJI affiliate parties have had conflicts with the ANP alliance. Nawaz Sharif did not meet other IJI member parties on this deal, which made the decision controversial. JUI-D's

president was IJI's vice president and JI's secretary general was also IJI's secretary general, but all were not briefed on the partnership between IJI and ANP. Many PML members claimed that Nawaz Sharif neglected his position as PML Punjab's president, and neglected the value of party making important decisions. PML weren't pleased either. Wyne, NA opposition leader, had tabled a resolution in NA calling Wali Khan a spy for his letters sent to the governments of India and Russia. He opposed removing the resolution and said he was unable to go ahead with the traitors. For the same reason, Qazi also called Wali Khan a traitor.(Sadiq, 1989)

JI claimed that if IJI -ANP coalition succeeded in getting its party government in the region, it would not recognise any ministries. JI and JUI-D demanded that IJI Heads meet to negotiate on the alliance with ANP. It was reported that none of the parties should be included in the coalition that either did not comply with IJI's core ideology or believed in secularism. Nawaz Sharif addressed the matter with JUI-D and JI representatives who reduced certain parties' concerns about the alliance with ANP. IJI supported the alliance with ANP with the promise that the partnership would only operate within the then NWFP PA. It has also been announced that IJI will not change its position on critical issues such as Afghanistan policy and Islamization. JI and JUI-D were assured that if the IJI-ANP coalition succeeded in overthrowing the PPP administration, they would not hand over any governorship or CM office to ANP. Vardag said ANP had not raised the issue of naming its governor or CM so there was no need to dwell on this subject. Sami said JUI (D) was dismissive of IJI's alliance with ANP but they considered it the only way to counter the brutality of the PPP.(Hashmi, 1989a)

The IPG, HJ, NPP, JAH (Lakhvi Group) and JMP remaining parties had no objection to the IJI-ANP alliance since they worked with ANP long. Some members of the ANP have endorsed this creation, others have fiercely denied it. Some saw that as a hopeful step for political progress and others blamed their leadership for allying with others who did not approve of party ideology. And a few ANP members left due to their coalition with IJI. Many ANP members accepted the coalition to resolve issues such as election of the chancellor, implementation of PWP, prohibition of recruiting and promotions, selection of the chairman of District Development Advisory Committees and many others. Some ANP adherents welcomed the decision to join IJI because their partnership with PPP did

not provide them with the facilities they needed. Six of eighty working committee members rejected the proposal to enter the coalition with IJI.

SES representatives did not attend the ANP meeting to support the decision to form a coalition with IJI. Most members were crucial to decision-making in the absence of those who opposed Party leadership judgement. ANP members have compiled a list for portfolio sharing in case IJI-ANP coalition was able to form provincial government. Any of the representatives preferred to address the issue before finalising the vote in the party's central executive council. Wali Khan explained to his supporters that the alliance did not hurt ANP's ideology, but it was a set-back for IJI as the IJI leaders branded the ANP as a traitor and when they made alliance with it they either reverted from previous statements or made alliance with the traitors. (Siddiqi, 1992)

To prevent indulging in controversy, a compromise nominee was expected as the leader of the opposition alliance in the NWFP PA. Jahangir was considered to be the most suitable choice, but Junejo's supporters claimed that Humayaun was more suitable than Jahangir. Humayun, opposition leader in the NWFP PA, did not contest Jahangir's nomination as the leader of the IJI-ANP coalition. Same ANP leaders has also had issues with Jahangir's appointment. They claimed that Jahangir was an independent member and would take regional politics to a non-party politics. All these claims did not prove sufficiently effective to deter the IJI-ANP coalition within the NWFP. (Shahid, 1989b)

IJI became ambitious to make government in the province before the provincial budget, after establishing a political coalition with ANP. After a strong motion of no confidence against Sherpao, Jahangir was elected as IJI-ANP Popular Candidate for CM office in NWFP. They also signed a seventeen-point agreement outlining the structure of the ANP-IJI coalition government. At the time, 51 MPAs including PPP, IJI forward bloc, and JUI-F were sponsored by PPP of 86. IJI had 19 MPAs and 14 ANP members were supportive. Thus, winning support from 13 independent MPAs and those of the IJI forward bloc to form government in the province was critical for it. Attractive packages and removal of references lodged against them at High Court were given to the independent MPAs and members of IJI forward bloc if they entered IJI to help it enter government. Following the failure of this rapprochement attempt, IJI forward bloc began efforts to increase the number of its members in the assembly and was moderately successful with the promise of key incentives and ministries. In order to make the motion of no confidence successful

against Sherpao, IJI also tried to get support from JUI-F. The Punjab government did not hesitate to spend big money to buy allegiance from many of the PPP MPAs. IJI forward bloc proved to be a major obstacle in this regard.(Shabbir Ahmad, 1989) Nothing could force them back to support IJI and they remained a member of the PPP government until the NWFP PA was disbanded in August 1990. Following the removal of ANP's assistance to the PPP government in NWFP, it was hardly feasible for PPP to retain its provincial government but an IJI forward bloc remained intact under the leadership of AyubTanoli and ShahzadaGustasap.Tanoli was usually supposed to be free to change loyalties if he feels his needs would be best represented by the other quarter. In NWFP PML was not coordinated and was under pressure because of the party's internal problems.The PPP used the situation in its favour by getting assistance from PML deserters According to Jatoi this was the beginning of PPP's incorrect political practises. They brought the IJI representatives into their cabinet and improved assembly horse trading.(Raja Zulfikar, 1989a)

QaziLateef blamed PPP for making seventeen IJI ministers in the twenty-two cabinet. Attempts were made to have these members back under the IJI banner, but this could not be achieved as IJI's Democratic Party was assigned government ministries.

Humayun, IJI Parliamentary Leader in the NWFP PA, filed a petition against Tanoli party in an election tribunal under the Political Parties Act (8-B) which excluded the case from its jurisdiction.Humayun went to the high court in Peshawar, which asked the election tribunal to rule on Humayun's argument. At the time, Sherpao was worrying about his place in the provincial government as if the court were going to vote against his IJI supporters, they could move back to their faction.The motion was voted down by the High Court. It claimed that IJI was not a political party but an electoral coalition as none of the alliance's component parties removed their separate identities, meaning that none of its members fell under section (8-b) of the Political Parties Act. This decision paved the way for all the representatives of the IJI who were fearful of the above Act. This decision had a negative impact on the political dynamic when one of the PPP members shortly after it joined the IJI. More sudden allegiance reforms were planned that could disrupt the majority of Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab province and the PPP government at Centre could face the same kind of problems. IJI leaders lodged an appeal in Supreme Court against the verdict of Peshawar High Court. The Supreme Court did not agree. It deemed the IJI a

political party and asked ECP to take care of the matter and hear the case according to the constitution. Humayun declared his support to the PPP government before the High Court ruling. It was known that he was convinced by Sherpao, Tanoli, and Shahzada Gustasp. Several reasons were offered for his shifting stance. Humayun said he changed his allegiance because of the president's request to reinforce the current government to regulate horse trade and face external challenge.

He clarified that he had changed his allegiance due to the attitude of IJI president Nawaz Sharif and his close relationship with Haq particularly after his dismissal from the office of NWFP PML president and the election of Salim Saifullah to the same office. He said his party members backed his decision rejected by the secretary general of NWFP IJI Nawabzada Mohsin Ali Khan. Against changing allegiance in favour of PPP Ghafoor Khan Jadoon (MPA of PML-N) filed a petition in Peshawar high court to remove Humayun's membership from the assembly under the defection provision of the Political Party Act. For a long time these topics were subject to discussion and little resulted from this political experiment. Horse-trading tended to be a general assembly practise. Most of IJI's mPAs, Fateh Mohammad Khan offered an idea that if the PPP government cuts the cabinet to 14 and agrees to stop horse dealing and blackmailing, he would not only be happy to support the government, but would also be able to make other IJI members support it. The ANP leader in the assembly Begum Nasim Wali Khan backed the idea of providing information of the cabinet that should consist of five ministers from the ruling party, four from ANP, three from current allies of the PPP (democratic IJI) and two from the IJI. She later called for an 8-member cabinet and a six-member supreme council containing both treasury and opposition members. The opposition drafted a resolution on this but was not permitted to address it in the assembly as the budget session would not allow the debate of such proposals. Later, during the budget session's windup address, CM Sherpao dismissed the resolution by claiming that it was too premature for a final decision. (Mohammed Nasir, 1989)

### **IJI's Relations with Federal Government**

The IJI and the PPP did not accept one another's government. They've made every effort to create problems for the other after the government was formed. The PPP government intervened in the provincial affairs; it halted the provincial finances and threatened to oust

the Punjab government from the IJI. PPP did not take any concrete action to fix the problems as CCI and NFC meetings were not scheduled which could help solve the simple problems. PPP did not hesitate to declare publicly that Khar has been made leader of the campaign "Nawaz Sharif HakoomatGirrao" (dismiss Nawaz Sharif government). In retaliation IJI decided to destabilise Benazir's administration. Both sides have made attempts to bring about rapprochement, but hardly any substantive measures were taken in this direction.(Chand, 1991)

### **Efforts to Destabilize the Premiership of Benazir**

IJI and its leadership, keeping the political enmity alive with PPP, sought to destabilise Benazir's government in every way possible. They didn't want to wait 5 years to complete assembly tenure. They did not support any of the PPP government's policies which prevented them from coordinating with the federal government. Various efforts were made to undermine the constitution of the PPP. Prominent efforts among many are discussed below.

IJI declared that while Pakistan's constitution did not bar a woman from being a PM, IJI was also against it. A woman should not be made head of state in an Islamic country according to Islamic political parties. They displayed their commitment to reject a female premiership, as it was against Islam's teachings. IJI opposed the election of a woman as head of state in a Muslim republic, but it did not succeed in preventing a vote of confidence in favour of Benazir. The Federal Shari'a Court (FSC) dismissed the petitions filed against a women's presidency in the Islamic State.(Isphahani, 1997)

Maulana Abdullah Drkhwasti, JUI official and JUI Central Deputy Secretary-General MaulanaZahidurRasheed opposed a women's leadership in a Muslim state. Rasheed declared a countrywide convention of religious scholars to take a unanimous vote against the election of women as head of state. He proposed reconciliation to JUI-F if it withheld support from the PPP administration. MuttahidaUlema Council on June 15, 1989 declared a protest toward a women's premiership in an Islamic state: Pakistan. This announcement has created uncertainty for the PPP administration. Benazir has sought to strengthen ties with IJI to face the pressure. A committee was set up to hold talks with the opposition but nothing significant came out of this process since the Punjab and Balochistan governments were hesitant to collaborate with the PPP. Similarly, the PPP refused to

agree with IJI. Owing to the past tradition of the political parties, the change by IJI and other religious scholars had little practical effect. In the 1965 presidential election against Ayub Khan JI supported Fatima Jinnah. Such historical events make people worry of political party slogans and usually those historic comparisons make such slogans frail and false. The move failed because of four members of the IJI, according to Nawaz Sharif; Shabbir Ahmad, Makhdoom Ahmad Anwar Aalam, Ghulam Ahmad Maneka and Ch. around Anwar Aziz. It was said that these members had signed the no-confidence motion but changed their mind before voting was held. Due to this change some members of PPP who had agreed to Support IJI refused to do so and the number of IJI supporters reduced from 119 to 104.(Saleemi, 1989)

Nawaz Sharif and Junejo decided to take disciplinary action against those league members who did not support IJI in its no-confidence move against PM. Many of the observers believe that joining hand of MQM with IJI prevented many PPP MNAs from Sindh to support IJI. Many of the PML members did not agree to the idea of selection of Jatoi as PM if the no-confidence motion succeeds. They believed that PML was a majority party in the NA and they could never allow a person to become PM who had no party of his own in the NA. They claimed that PML was a majority party in the NA, and could never encourage a person to become a PM who had no party in the NA.

Many IJI representatives have disagreed with the no-confidence change proposal. They were demanding to make democracy work. They were of the opinion that if successful, the motion of no-confidence could not bring in a stable government.(Iftikhar, 1989) They claimed that they could not afford the election cycle again in a short amount of time despite having invested a large amount of money on the election campaign. Any opponents claimed that, as a result of fresh elections, those who opposed the change were simply not confident if they would return to legislatures again. It was reported that one explanation behind the no-confidence motion would help to create a stable government. It was said that after the no-confidence vote had been approved, a new Minister would be elected with the help of several parties who would urge the president to dissolve the assembly and conduct fresh elections, putting a stable government both in the centre and in the provinces. None of these factors played a key role in the collapse of this motion, but each of them had its own position, which played its part. The motion brought a big

shift to the politics of Sindh. MQM announced that it had reached an agreement with IJI on 18 September 1989. The Deal was not realistic.

Most citizens and observers believed the deal had been negotiated for face-saving purposes. The money and other facilities provided by IJI for MQM leadership played an actual role. After the motion's failure, MQM's cooperation with Jiye Sindh improved and created problems in the country's law and order situation. The condition worsened to such a degree that at the September-October NA session in 1990, CM Sindh resigned from the office on February 23, 1990. IJI prepared a second motion of no confidence against PM, but it was not tabled until the dissolution of NA. Beg, Qazi Although several others felt that the motion of no confidence was not beneficial for their own purposes. Qazi believed IJI should focus on its organisation when nearly 13 billion rupees were invested on the first step according to Beg, which was very costly for a developing country like Pakistan. Rasool Baksh Palijo and Ali Hasan, secretary general of ANP, both opposed the suggestion of bringing second no-confidence against PM. Some people suspect that IJI had support from intelligence services for second no-confidence move. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, when describing the reasons of NA breakup, said that the tactics used to bribe them were shameful in winning over the sympathies of opposition party members. MNAs were threatened, plots were given, licences and departments were issued. Any representatives acquired property and loans. Many that did not change loyalties received rewards from their own parties. Among several other causes, political turmoil was a leading factor for the NA and PAs division that was triggered by horse trade between legislatures. (Qureshi, 1994)

### **Policy Matters and Controversies between IJI and Centre**

IJI and PPP had difficulties with each other to such a degree that they did not bother to assist each other on any of the topics, whether political, economic or other matters of national or foreign significance. Both followed opposing opinions and criticised each other using all arguments of some kind. Any of the problems are discussed below in order to illustrate the degree of vindictiveness against one another. (Anjum, 1989)

The President retained executive powers under the 1973 Constitution. He just could work with PM's approval. He made a constitutional amendment after Zia wanted to civilianize the government which is known as the Eighth Amendment. Via this provision, president

was granted the power to dismantle government if he felt the state business was not functioning in compliance with the Constitution. Presiding officer may designate PM until March 20, 1990. He had the Governor named the authorising authority of the provincial caretaker administration. Via this provision, the selection of Chief Electoral Officer, Member of the Federal Public Service Commission, and Heads of Army, Navy, and Air Force was made the President's choice. The President may even return a bill to the parliament for reconsideration of the bill or all of its parts. Zia inserted this provision in the constitution to preserve his power of the federal government. During Zia's tenure, none of the politicians questioned this, but the new governments elected in 1988 or after calling it a fault for democratic progress. They also argued that this amendment created a political gap that made the constitution a source of uncertainty in the parliamentary democracy's smooth functioning. For these reasons PPP sought to repeal this provision after entering government in 1988. (Kamran Khan, 1989) The removal of the eighth amendment was a burning topic that was under debate from 1988 until its removal. Benazir dreaded this provision, as it grants the president the power to dissolve the assemblies. Around the same time this provision grants the president those rights that are usually held by PM in democratic states. After he took the oath of PM Benazir's office, he began to make attempts to revoke this provision or change any of its clauses. She was not receiving a 2/3 majority in the assembly because she wanted opposition support to enact any constitutional amendments. The IJI took a firm stand and asked the PPP government to prepare a draught amending paper. Until tabling it, IJI ordered that extensive consultations be conducted with government and opposition leaders. The opposition decided to pick the clauses which required modifications. It also requested that the powers of PM and the president be kept in check even after the constitutional eighth amendment was amended. Few political parties and politicians, such as JI and Shujaat, decided to revive the original constitution of 1973. (Mirza, 1990)

Before the 1988 JI elections, and several other parties requested a return to the 1973 constitution, but most of them requested balance of power after the establishment of the PPP. Jatoi refused any possibility of abolishing the Eighth Amendment during the Benazir period. This provision does not prohibit her from ruling the country in an authoritarian manner according to him. He pointed at Bhutto's brutality and said no one could deter Benazir from pursuing her father's mindset if the Eighth Amendment had

been repealed. He saw eighth amendment as a basis for protecting Pakistani citizens from constitutional dictatorship. Contrary to that PM decided to abolish the whole amendment. It even refused any talks over all of its clauses. After a short period of time PPP discovered that it could not unilaterally change the Eighth Amendment, it began discussions with opposition but at the point opposition did not respond properly. PPP used another tactic of purchasing loyalties of IJI MNAs to tackle this case. IJI organised a committee of three members comprising Shujaat (Chairman), Jatoi, and Wyne. The Committee consulted with other parliamentary parties to address the question of the Eighth Amendment and to devise a shared policy for dealing with the issue in Parliament. After negotiation with other groups, the IJI parliamentary party agreed to reject the abolition of the Eighth Amendment. According to Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi, the entire debate on the Eighth Amendment was above the actual political stage. He said that the amendment contained two aspects which were most criticised. One was the President's authorization to keep COAS office which was no longer there since Zia's death. About the second question of the president's right to abolish the NA, he said that no one could dismantle without solid reasons after a court ruling on Zia's dissolution of the NA. Niazi said the authority of president and PM needs to be controlled. He said President should not be like Chaudhary Fazal Ilahi or Junejo, Pakistan's PM from 1985 to 1988. (Tabassum, 2003)

Benazir hated such claims. She tried to repeal this provision by whatever means she used multiple methods for. In order to raise the number of her followers within the NA she sought to buy the vote of many of the IJI leaders for whom she worked to some degree but with the passing of time she lost the support of many of her own party members as well as that of MQM and ANP. This defeat does not cause her to table the proposal to revoke the provision, because it takes a 2/3 vote to change the constitution. Another argument could be public support against this amendment but against the Eighth Amendment, she did not rally popular support. Her attempts to repeal this provision lead only to the President's frustration toward her. (Akhter, 1988)

### **Discrepancy Regarding the Construction of Kalabagh Dam**

Since the beginning of Pakistan, Kalabagh Dam has been considered an important source of energy generation and irrigation of barren lands to achieve self-reliance in the

cultivation of foodstuffs by storing water. Its construction was first proposed during Quaid-i Azam's lifetime on March 14, 1948. Proposal to develop KBD was drafted in 1953. The Dam's feasibility study was prepared by numerous field experts and chosen a suitable location for its development. Pakistan's government invested more than two billion rupees on this initiative but the proposal was on papers only until 1988. In the beginning, the Dam could provide 2400 megawatts of energy, and later could provide more than 3400 megawatts of electricity. Mangla and Terbella Dam, Pakistan's two main operating dams, generate just 2500 megawatts of electricity and the KBD could provide more than the two's output. The dam could meet the requirements of the four provinces and the Dam Lake could help to irrigate 5 million acres of land that could bring about a revolutionary increase in agricultural yield. Despite all the groundwork done and the expenditure made, the construction of the dam could not be started due to provincial reservations. There had been conflicts of opinion about KBD's building. Provinces had concerns about dam building. NWFP political parties, particularly ANP, opposed building KBD, They had threatened to blow up the dam, if built. PPP had opposed the building of KBD in Sindh in its election campaign and endorsed it in the Punjab. But it was virtually unable to support the building of this dam in the fear of losing popular support in Sindh. Balochistan had barely any direct association with the building of KBD so it did not take any definite stand on it. Punjab is the only province accepting of KBD development. Punjab, taking advantage of the opinion of the engineering experts and chairman WAPDA propagated the advantages of the dam.<sup>168</sup> During Benazir's first premiership the conflict of opinion became public. During her first term as Pakistan's PM, Benazir tried to build consensus about building KBD but faced serious criticism. One of ANP's key reasons for entering Sherpao government in NWFP was opposition by PPP to building KBD.(Burki, 1991)

The governments of Zia-up Haq, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif spent nearly 1.2 billion rupees on this project. The Dam had to be completed by 1988 according to World Bank plans. Any delay in constructing this dam could raise construction costs and because agricultural losses that required care to feed Pakistan's rising population. Other plans were made to dilute concerns about the project. The dam architecture was changed to save the city of Nowshera, and its height was lowered from 925 to 910 feet. It was said it can conserve just one-fourth of the water that is currently dumped in the bay. It was also

clarified that all the provinces will have the water reserved in the dam lake accessible during the dry weather to take care of the agricultural operation. The dam could prove to be the cheapest outlet for generating electricity, which was a big necessity for industrial development and satisfying other requirements. However, all these claims could hardly yield any meaningful results as Sindh and NWFP claimed that the Dam was only in favour of the Punjab that would consume the water share of these two provinces.

IJI encountered difficulties in propagating the value of constructing a KBD. One of its main allies; NPP belonged to Sindh, and publicly opposed KBD's notion of constructing. JI was a vocal supporter of the Dam. Later ANP joined IJI's opposition coalition that vowed to blow up the dam if any attempt was made to build it. This made it complicated for IJI leadership and it couldn't stress the need to create the KBD. Equally it couldn't publicly help those who opposed it.(Khalid, 1990)

### **Nuclear Issue**

In the mid-1950s Pakistan's nuclear programme was developed. A 12-member Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was appointed in 1956. Z.A. to study the feasibility of developing Atomic energy, after becoming Minister of Fuel, Power and Natural Resources in 1960, Bhutto developed government interest in the creation of an atomic energy programme. As Minister of International Affairs 1963-65 Z.A. Bhutto urged President Ayub Khan to work on Pakistan's nuclear programme as India pushed forward. Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme began in January 1972 with ZAB conducting a conference of physicists and engineers at Multan. During the late 1970s, Pakistan's programme developed equipment and skills for critical uranium enrichment. These attempts were made further by Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1975. Under the leadership of Dr. Khan, Pakistan received resources sufficient to develop its uranium enrichment capabilities. By 1986 Pakistan had produced enough material to produce a nuclear bomb. The mechanism proceeded and, according to reports, Pakistan had gained the capacity to perform a nuclear test in 1987. During the first half of the decade of democracy the (1988-1999) president and chief of the army exerted commanding control over important policy issues like Pakistan's nuclear strategy. Ghulam Ishaq Khan was well informed from ZAB's premiership of Pakistan's nuclear programme and, after becoming president, he took over the entire responsibility for the programme. Benazir was not fully aware of the

nature of the state's nuclear programme. She usually believed that her behaviour during her visit to the US and readiness to take the CIA chief briefing on Pakistan's nuclear programme generated doubts about her remained uninformed about the success of the nuclear programme. This presented the IJI leadership with an incentive to unleash attacks against Benazir and their attempts to curb or reverse the nuclear programme.(Tabassum, 2003)

### **Afghanistan Problem**

Afghanistan spent almost 10 years in a state of war with Russia, from 1979 to 1988. Throughout this war Pakistan has helped Afghanistan in its fight for independence from Russian tyranny. Pakistan not only gave Afghanistan moral support but also supported it with weapons and gave instruction to its warriors in their fight against Russia. Geneva Accord signed on April 14, 1988 was one of those efforts which offered a detailed timetable for the repatriation of Russian forces from Afghanistan. Pakistan's government remained personally involved in the whole process but the situation changed after Zia's death in August 1988. No consistent position regarding Afghanistan was taken during the transitional period. Benazir did not back Zia's Afghanistan policy for which she faced opposition criticism because IJI wanted to pursue Zia's Afghanistan policy and support Mujahidin. IJI wanted the Benazir administration to recognise the new Mujahedeen government in Afghanistan and to support it. Qazi Hussain claimed that the PPP government had avoided declaring support for Afghan Jihad which was unjust on the government's part as Pakistan had long played an important role in settling the conflict in the region. Jatoi and JI took the view that government-level funding for Afghanistan was important. Federal government refused approval of the Mujahidin government in Afghanistan according to those demands. The situation got more tensed with the decision by the PPP government to bar Hamid Gul from the ISI chief's office. Hamid Gul had long been working for the cause of Afghanistan, and his dismissal was a strong indicator that the government of Benazir did not wish to help the transitional government of Afghanistan. IJI has dismissed this move as a response against Pakistan's stance on Afghanistan. In opposition to the government's decision, IJI organised demonstrations and demanded that the federal government recognise Mujahedeen's transitional government in

Afghanistan and put pressure on the international community to enforce the Geneva agreement to address the Afghanistan crisis.(Zehra, 1989a)

### **Kashmir Issue**

The problem of Kashmir is a big point of dispute between Pakistan and India that has been unresolved for over sixty years. This topic has an influence not only on all these countries' foreign affairs but also has an influential effect on local politics. Political parties are using this issue to collect popular opinion to their benefit. Political parties usually use this topic to show the other insincere against the government. IJI followed the same kind of strategy to prove Benazir a traitor particularly during the visit of the Rajiv Gandhi at the SAARC Meeting. Benazir's one-to-one meetings with Rajiv have been made a matter of general debate. In a press conference Rajiv Gandhi specifically declared Kashmir an integral part of India, and Benazir did not adequately present the point of view of Pakistan, which was attacked by the IJI parties.(Rajput, 2005) Because of their unconsidered approach towards the Kashmir issue, they had an opportunity to prove the PPP leadership traitor and insincere with Pakistan. Opposition took the view that Benazir had an opportunity on the SAARC platform to address the Kashmir issue, but the opportunity was not taken. In January 1990 a Kashmir Conference was held to address the federal government's propaganda of the opposition. All four CMs, PM AJ & K and leaders of all political parties took part in the meeting. Foreign Minister SahibzadaYaqub Khan told the conference that the government was unable to take up the issue in UN, SAARC or any other regional forum and that it needed to be discussed on a bilateral basis. After the meeting, opposition parties blamed the government for its poor position on the Kashmir issue. All IJI parties were united in their opposition to the PPP stance on the Kashmir dispute.(Shahid, 2000)

### **Contention on Budgetary Allocations**

Pakistan is, in practise, a federation composed of four states, and the central government, along with semi-independent tribal areas under federal government direct rule. There are numerous forms of federations, like the USA, Switzerland and Germany. Several states are unified by such rules in these countries. Pakistan also claims to be a federal government, but there is an issue of sharing powers and establishing spheres of

jurisdiction between the central government and the federating units. The Constitution includes a long concurrent list which causes complexity and administrative challenges particularly when there is a disagreement between the federal government and the provinces. The first century of Benazir's premiership was the worst example of this centre-provincial rivalry over powers-and-resource-sharing. The most protuberant was the dispute in the Punjab between the federal government and the IJI administration, and the Balochistan alliance government over the allocation of funds and resources to execute development plans. A National Economic Council meeting (NEC) was held to discuss the economic problems but ended without achieving any meaningful results.<sup>188</sup> Nawaz Sharif refused any recommendation for the annual growth plan, the provincial budget deficit and the People's Works Program (PWP). (Zehra, 1989b) It is said that PM sought to recap the country's economic difficulties, but many people claimed that Nawaz Sharif acted as a spokesperson for those who did not want to address the problems. Bugti also dismissed PM's claims and demanded that Council of Common Interest (CCI) meetings be convened. On the topic of holding the CCI conference, PPP and IJI appeared hostile to both of the Oths. A lengthy episode of accusations and counter-allegations with regard to the CCI meeting still remained underway. Problem remained unresolved until the Assemblies were disbanded in August 1990. (Nawaz Sharif, interview, 1989)

### **Council of Common Interests (CCI)**

Government and opposition were disappointed with the results of the NEC conference that took place prior to the 1989 budget. Government stressed its own views on the use of economic factors and their allocation among the provinces that were refused in Punjab by the IJI CM and in Balochistan by Bugti. CM Punjab and Balochistan claimed that federal government was dealing with provincial affairs under its PWP, such as road building, schools, power supply etc. Later in the same chapter the specifics are mentioned. In order to address the economic challenges and distribute discretionary funds between the Core and the provinces, the Punjab government requested that the CCI meet. There were hopes the CCI meeting would help fix the problems. If the CCI struggled to carry a solution to the issues, there was a way out to hold joint parliamentary meeting because there were no worries of dead lock. Nawaz Sharif stressed calling the CCI conference, as he was assured of his win over the federal government. Nawaz Sharif enjoyed the assistance of

CM Balochistan and CM Sindh. Issues for which CCI meeting was sought were: development of Kalabagh Dam, allocation of electricity between provinces and natural gas royalties.(Rizvi, 1991)

At the CCI conference, Nawaz Sharif decided to take up the question of water sharing among the provinces as well as improving his position and gaining support from the CMs of other provinces. It was thought that if the CMs of the provinces address things, it would be easier to understand each other's problems and concerns. When the federal government was delaying calling the CCI conference, Nawaz Sharif requested joint parliamentary session. The very fundamental reason for this urgency was the decision by the federal government to suspend the Punjab accounts which had a negative effect on the province's economic development. IJI focused on legislative joint session when it had a majority in the Senate. There were only four PPP members of parliament's upper chamber. IJI also had an advantage as both IJI member groups were in favour of addressing economic and growth problems through the CCI conference. The motion to hold a CCI conference or a joint parliamentary session was then addressed to the President by the IJI representatives for negotiations in order to address the issues. The proposal to call a joint parliamentary session was a political strategy as the PPP had partial reinstatement. Nawaz Sharif had full support from Bugti as both expressed a view on the administrative steps taken by Benazir. CM Balochistan Bugti blamed the government of Benazir for its policies on regional sovereignty, the allocation of development funds, the spending strategy of the federal government regarding the provinces and the intervention of the government in the regional development plans. He was of the opinion that Benazir was conducting state affairs as a unitary entity, rather than handling national relations according to federation standards.<sup>198</sup> Bugti fiercely opposed the PWP and asked the federal government for Sui Gas royalty, but he had to tamp down his concerns and requests after a rapprochement between the JUI-F and the federal government. In addition to talks with the federal minister for law , justice and regional cooperation, Iftikhar and Bugti mended the relations between the federal government and the Balochistan administration.(Haque, 1989) But there was no joint consensus statement about the topics on which the negotiation specifics were not revealed. Federal government used delaying tactics to stop calling the CCI. It claimed that before it was

convened, representatives of the federal and provincial governments would agree on the meeting's agenda.

The federal government also objected to IJI and Bugti's non-cooperative behaviour and said the meeting would not yield significant outcomes with the opposition mindset in the interests of opposition. Benazir claimed that the meeting would expose the problems and intensify the tension between the central government and its federating units instead of settling the disputes. PPP wanted to stop the CCI meeting and if the government was unable to overcome the conflict at the Parliament's joint meeting, it was allowed to take the decision and the PPP did not have a majority there. With respect to the CCI Chief Justice, he noted that this was a source of friction between the federal and provincial governments. But facing persistent requests from three out of four Federating Units, the government refused to call on it to resolve the issues that culminated in the federation's fragmentation and conflict with its units. The provincial government of Punjab and Balochistan lodged a complaint in the Supreme Court against the federal government, asking for a Council meeting to settle the problems. PPP Iftikhar's minister answering a question said CCI meeting could be convened if a written request from the provincial governments is received with a specific agenda covering the issues within CCI's ambit. He said that he also read such demands in various newspapers but after reading some news of such issue, such a high-level meeting could not be held. It seems that IJI was busy in scoring points against the government rather than making demands properly following the process which gave the PPP room to postpone things according to their own preference. Recently the federal government decided to hold the CCI meeting after lengthy meetings of the mediation committee but Ghulam Ishaq Khan disbanded the assemblies before any consensus could be achieved. (Abdullah, interview, 1990)

### **Creation of Provincial Television Station by IJI**

Tussle between the IJI and the PPP has shown in every government and opposition structure. One of the main strategies to pressurise the IJI government was the use of National Television (TV) against the IJI administration. The Federal government has initiated an ambitious campaign of derogatory propaganda against the government of the IJI. Every unpleasant incident in the Punjab was presented as a result of the IJI Government's corruption or mismanagement. No IJI reward gets attention on television.

Because of this mentality, leadership at the IJI was afraid of losing reputation with the common people. The Punjab administration asked the federal government to allow it to air its opinion on television for an hour everyday. In reality, it wanted to get a forum to help it project its constructive initiatives and fight the accusations raised by the federal government. IJI government wished to use the TV to inform people about Islam and also about the social evils. This claim was denied by the federal government. After this Punjab government agreed to set up its own TV channel with the approval of the provincial cabinet and submitted an application to the federal government for permission. Azad Kashmir government and a private university Peoples Television Network (PTN) submitted the same kind of applications. (Shahbaz, 1990)

Punjab government proposal was refused. The Kashmir government's application was considered, and PTN was permitted to launch a television channel. The Punjab government has lodged a petition against the federal government's decision. It took the view that the constitution had stated that if it wishes to build and use the transmitters in the province, the federal government would not grant permission to broadcast to the provincial government. The appeal was pending in the Supreme Court until the Benazir government was ousted in 1990.

In any field of administration the disparity in opinion between the IJI and the PPP remained predominant. Relationships between the Punjab provincial government and the governor were no different. Benazir sought to postpone the oath of taking ceremony of Nawaz Sharif as the Punjab's CM after entering the legislature. The former governor has not followed the orders that lead to the province's change of government. Benazir appointed (retd.) General Tikka Khan as the Punjab Governor to keep the provincial government updated and to control them. Tikka Khan's nomination evoked conflict between the federal government and the Punjab government. Tikka Khan was not accepted as Punjab Governor as he had lost the 1988 election in one of Rawalpindi's constituencies. This was not the only problem between the Punjab Governor and the Punjab Government. Tikka Khan sought to manipulate bureaucracy and began to advise them. Nawaz Sharif didn't like this and advised the governor that he could only recommend the CM but couldn't get personally involved in administrative matters. Nawaz Sharif changed the provincial laws to support his stand and allowed the governor to be involved in administrative matters. In response to the hostile attitude of Nawaz Sharif,

Tikka Khan created obstacles in the provincial legislative and other matters. The Punjab administration passed some legislation on the adoption of Islamic principles which was returned by the governor with the observation that such legislation should be performed at federal level with the guidelines of IIC. This kind of conflict and friction remained evident throughout the twenty-month rule of the PPP.

### **Other Issues**

When addressing major issues arising from provincial administrative problems that remained sources of friction between the federal government and the Punjab government, it is difficult to neglect minor issues. The federal government and the Punjab government did not hesitate to establish problems by blaming each other for each other. One of these minor problems was the decision by the federal government to assume charge of the Zakat Fund funds and disburse them according to its own plans. This increased problems for the Punjab government as it had been helping to uplift many poor families with the Zakat scheme. The Punjab government not only blamed the federal government for this action but also established a baitulmaal fund in the 1989 budget and initially started to administer zakat to the needy with the sum of one billion rupees. It began to provide the poor with basic needs of life through mosque committees. The Punjab government blamed the federal government for not supplying the Punjab with adequate fertilisers to establish food shortages in the province and make it impossible for common citizens and show that the IJI government in the province was a failure. Although the federal government took the view that the provincial government had not told it of its necessity in due to time. It also told people at various forums that the Punjab government created artificial scarcity to blame it, as the province was already supplied with fertilisers according to the Punjab government's demands. The problem was a deliberate attempt to establish hate against Sindh and the PPP government in Punjab, according to the PPP administration.

Disturbed state of law and order in Sindh and Punjab gave the IJI and PPP the chance to attack their political opponents. According to the IJI government, all the murders and illegal acts were the product of the federal government's policies and plans. Parallel charges were levelled by the Sindh government against the Punjab government over the troubled state of law and order in Sindh that the IJI rejected. Who was ever responsible for

the mismanagement of several matters of national importance, neither sought to address the concerns, yet stayed concentrated on accusations yet counter-allegations that only culminated in the ordinary people's the difficulties.

### **Dismissal of Benazir Government**

Democratic style of government did not act properly and after twenty months of its formation, Benazir's new government was ousted. Several accusations were made against her. It is widely accepted that most of the charges were the same as those levelled by Zia against the government of Junejo. Benazir did not prove to be a stable leader as many of the problems could be avoided, such as horse trade and non-cooperative centre-provincial partnerships. Conflict between federations and provincial governments, and resource mismanagement was one of the main charges against Benazir administration. IJI proved to be a fragile coalition as a strong opposition that could do well, but lack of unity within the member parties hindered it from taking any progressive steps. IJI leadership had barely concentrated on its organisation which further brought IJI to a weakened position.(Sagar, 1989)GhulamIshaq Khan's tendency against PPP government was evident in the process of dismissal which also posed questions about the government's impartiality for future elections. On 6 August 1990, the government of Benazir was dissolved at the Base. The same action has been taken in the PPP-ruled two provinces. The government was dissolved in the remaining two provinces on the recommendation of the chief ministers. With the decision to dismiss the PPP government a new period of political growth began with a fresh zeal to win the election among the political parties where new alliances were made and existing ones were further strengthened to take advantage of any opportunity to win the political parties' election.

### **Issues Regarding the Appointment of Caretaker Government**

The primary aim of the caretaker government was to hold free and fair elections as soon as possible and to pass power to the elected members of the people. A general demand over the election of the caretaker government was that behaving impartially during the democratic period should be unbiased. Many have questioned Jatoi's appointment as interim Minister, since he was one of the previous government's popular opposition figures. Many of his peers were still having trouble with his assessment because of

multiple factors. Qazi opposed Jatoi's nomination as Caretaker PM without consulting with either the IJI or JI. He also criticised cabinet selection on the grounds that all of the persons who were responsible had positions in the caretaker cabinet. Ghafoor claimed that Ghulam Ishaq Khan lost his unbiased impression with Jatoi's appointment. Junejo, PML chief, also criticised the appointment on the grounds that this choice shows that no other party had any competent representative to be named. He was also critical of the system of naming the cabinet as president of PML he was not consulted until his party representatives were appointed to the temporary cabinet in 335. Junejo's loyal backers were left out of the cabinet which he claims discriminated against. He declared that if government needed PML's support it would have to contact the PML leadership otherwise the group would not be able to take responsibility for any of the actions taken by the caretaker governments. Later, he agreed with the president's decision and asked the members of his party to make every effort to hold free and equal elections at a given time. Benazir doubted Jatoi's impartiality. She claimed this was intended to harm her election campaign and to discourage the PPP from winning the upcoming elections. Asghar claimed that a divided government could not hold free and fair elections. Some of the politicians blamed the caretaker government because the primary duty of the caretaker government was to administer the elections, but Jatoi declared his four-point plan to rule after taking over the administration: clear political mindset, fairness, honesty and transparency. (Habib, 1995) The intermediate period illustrated indifference between IJI member groups. Instead of an overall IJI results, the leaders were ultimately concerned with the popularity, reputation and electoral gain of their parties. They were worried about their own role in the caretaker government and its effect on the policy path to come. It indicates that the leaders' focus has been their opinion and their political party picture. In reference to the coalition and its success the leadership lacked a common feeling. During the transitional time this mentality was evident and the preparations for the elections. Alliance, its structure and policy have been overlooked when addressing the Transitional Government and the preparations for elections. Considering the value of elections and the democratic process, political parties formed alliances with other parties and made detailed strategies for winning the elections.

## **Criticism against the IJI**

As a major shareholder of the caretaker administration, IJI was attacked by its critics for using official media, vehicles and even power highlighted in their election campaign by Benazir and TahirulQadri. GA was said to be a group of JamhoorDushman (enemies of the masses) who united only to raise threat to the PPP. Benazir told people it was a mix of various groups with differing viewpoints on fundamental issues. She told the people that IJI would break stability only a few days after it came to power because there was no agreement on simple issues such as Afghanistan and the building of Kalabagh Dam. In Quetta, leaders of PNP and PPP accused the caretaker government to register fake voters and issue ID cards. They also opposed relocation and recruitment of polling workers calling it a bribery scheme for the elections. When addressing the IJI election campaign, PPP leadership claimed that the IJI leadership acted against the federation's interests as it fanned political problems and racial biases. IJI has also been blamed for using Islam as a symbol to draw and inspire common people. The announcement of G.M. was one of the acts of the IJI caretaker administration. Syed which was a worry for Pakistan's popular people in general and that of the people in Sindh in particular. Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani and other leaders have rigorously attacked this move. The PPP has also made attacks on Nawaz Sharif's personal life and company and his government in Punjab. In response to the criticism Nawaz Sharif said that Benazir's responsibility for his family company had been continued for twenty months and if she did not file any appeals in court it indicates that there was nothing behind her allegations. About Benazir's remarks on the law and order situation in Punjab Nawaz Sharif told the people that these were merely efforts to divert attention. (Zaheer Ahmad, 1990)

## **The Dismemberment of the IJI**

Compared to other political relationships in Pakistan's history IJI lasted a bit longer. It prevailed in two general elections, stayed for two years in opposition, and then was able to emerge into office. The alliance's dismemberment process is considered to have intensified after the 1990 elections. The cause for this decline has been numerous. Others were unique to the individual and some were related to demands or agendas of the party. The factor of discontent with the leadership also played an important role in IJI's

dismemberment, for example Jatoi wanted to become PM after the 1990 elections but was rejected. Qazi refused to join the coalition, and opted to play the opposition part. Smaller parties were not granted a stake of government due to their demands as these parties had barely any legislative representation. Poya, HJ representative intended to get a seat in the Senate but the coalition ticket was rejected. Sami has had their own doubts about PirFazal. Through the course of time these concerns and issues were common and played a part in disbanding the coalition.(TalatAslam, 1989)

It is less daunting to manage such a broad-based partnership when in opposition but it is equally hard to keep such a group happy in government. IJI convener Nawaz Sharif encountered many problems in smooth functioning of government. He enlarged his cabinet in 1991 and gave ministries to many including ANP representatives but failed to make JI a part of his large cabinet. He had also been ineffective in his cabinet changing JUI and JAH. Religiously focused political parties could not become part of the cabinet that proved detrimental for Nawaz Sharif to govern things positively.Nawaz Sharif could run the government reasonably smoothly if he could retain the cooperation of the religious parties but was sure of PML 's power within the assemblies, he overlooked the fact that religious parties were one of the major sources of his popularity. These aspects hindered the coalition from functioning effectively and divided one by one individual parties for their own purposes. HJ was the first among them preceded respectively by NPP and JI.(Makhdoom Ali Khan, 1989)

### **Dismissal of Nawaz Government**

President GhulamIshaq Khan has dissolved the National Assembly finding it in the nation's best interest. He criticised the government's economic policies. Nawaz Sharif did not regard the institutions as Pakistan's PM and intervened in administrative matters according to the President's dissolution order. He reported that Nawaz Sharif used to use offensive language as well.299 President GhulamIshaq Khan claimed that he had no personal disputes with Nawaz Sharif but that he had to take care of certain items as the custodian of constitution. He said cabinet has a crucial role to play in the political structure but cabinet would not meet for months. Nawaz Sharif had little time to consult with his cabinet members and, above all, as president, he had the right to know the crucial

political issues that Nawaz Sharif never cared for. According to Liaquat Balouch Nawaz Sharif acquired trust in the system as he was a source of Benazir and Junejo's influence. That made him think a strong leader himself. Nawaz Sharif wasn't needed after the dismissal of Benazir establishment as he was expected earlier. Everything he could do was to reinforce his coalition and take political campaigns intelligently but instead of IJI he relied on MQM and ANP and tried to accumulate all the forces in his hands. He also had issues with the powers that the president possessed, such as the appointment of superior judiciary and COAS. This idea brought him into confrontation with Ghulam Ishaq Khan which has intensified his government's process of dismissal. Nawaz Sharif's government was the third dismissal under the Eighth Amendment in five years but this time public reaction to the dismissed government was distinct. The public at large came out to support Nawaz Sharif against his government's presidential dismissal announcement. People were gathering at railway stations from where the ex-PM train had to travel raising the slogan Qadambarhao Nawaz Sharif ham tumharysaathain (just make a statement that we are with you Nawaz Sharif). This public assistance statement was a source of confidence for Nawaz Sharif, and at the same time an indication to determine that the situation was different from the previous dismissals.

### **Conclusion**

The analysis of centre–province relations in Pakistan during the period 1988–1990 reveals that political rivalry rather than constitutional principles largely shaped federal interactions. The persistent confrontation between the federal PPP government and the IJI-led provincial administrations, particularly in Punjab and Balochistan, weakened cooperative federalism and eroded democratic norms. Constitutional forums such as the Council of Common Interests and the National Economic Council failed to function as effective mechanisms for conflict resolution due to executive dominance, politicisation, and lack of institutional maturity. Instead of fostering consensus, these bodies became arenas of political contestation. The misuse of presidential powers under Article 58(2)(b) further destabilised the democratic process by enabling the dismissal of elected governments and undermining parliamentary supremacy. Coalition politics, opportunistic alliances, and the frequent use of caretaker governments intensified political uncertainty and deepened centre–province mistrust. These dynamics not only obstructed policy coordination and development planning but also marginalised provincial voices in national decision-making. Ultimately, the study demonstrates that unresolved centre–province tensions, combined with elite-driven political conflicts and weak institutional frameworks, contributed significantly to democratic fragility and political instability in

Pakistan. Sustainable federalism, therefore, requires constitutional adherence, institutional strengthening, and a political culture rooted in cooperation rather than confrontation.

## References

- Ahmad, A. H. (1990, October 16). *IJI in a strong position*. Dawn, p. 25.
- Akhter, M. (1988, November 22). *IJI high command to decide future strategy today*. The Muslim, p. 22.
- Albright, D., & Hibbs, M. (1992). *Pakistan's bomb: Out of the closet*. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August.
- Askari, H. (1988, November 30). *Search for an opposition*. The Nation, p. 7.
- AskariRizvi, H. (1991). *Pakistan's nuclear program*. Karachi: Pakistan Association for Peace Research.
- Awan, A. G. (1991). *Tīnmuntakhibwazīr-e-ā'zamkībartarfī*. Lahore: Unique Publishing Company.
- Awan, A. G. (1988, November 1). *Tīnmuntakhibwazīr-e-ā'zamkībartarfī*. Dawn, p. 196.
- Burki, S. J. (1989, December 18). *Subā'i assembly Punjab: Mubāhithāt*. The Nation, p. 636.
- Burki, S. J. (1991). *Zia's eleven years in Pakistan: Under the military*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Chand, A. (1991). *Pakistan: Party politics, pressure groups and minorities*. New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers.
- Chaudhri, M. N. (2005). *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*. Lahore: Lahore Law Times Publications.
- Din, Z. (1998). *Women in electoral politics: 1985–1997*. Islamabad: Institute of Human Rights and Democracy.
- Hashmi, A. (1988, November 28). *JUI-D announced its support to deny the rumor that JUI-D had parted ways with IJI*. Pakistan Times, p. 25.
- Hashmi, A. (1989, June 9). *IJI, ANP forge alliance*. Pakistan Times, p. 14.
- Hashmi, A. (1989, July 2). *JUI too gives up opposition to IJI-ANP accord*. Pakistan Times, p. 15.

- Haque, I. (1989, June). *Daggers drawn*. The Herald, p. 37.
- Haque, I. (1990, September). *Nothing can be achieved if Ms Bhutto is forced out of the game*. The Herald, p. 47.
- Hassan, A. S. (1989, June 26). *Governing passion*. The Jang, p. 27.
- Hussain, Z. (1989, February). *Law and disorder*. The Herald, p. 38.
- Hussain, Z. (1989, January). *Interview of ZafarullahJamali*. The Herald, pp. 64–65.
- Isphahani, M. (1997). *Pakistan: Dimensions of insecurity*. Dehradun: The English Book Depot.
- Keesing's Record of World Events. (1989). Vol. 35, No. 12, p. 37150.
- Keesing's Record of World Events. (1990). Vol. 36, No. 12, p. 37150.
- Khalid, I. (1990, October). *Party time: Smaller parties*. The Herald (Election Special), p. 33.
- Khan, M. A. (1989, September). *Constitutionally speaking*. The Herald, pp. 66–67.
- Naqvi, K. (1989, April 21–27). *Nawaz Sharif kīqāmatārā 'tawrqadarafzā 'imein Peoples Party kāhissa*. The Zindagi, p. 37.
- Nasir, A. (1990, February). *Law and disorder*. The Herald, p. 38.
- Qureshi, M. F. (1994). *Nawaz Sharif: Aikhukmrānaiksiyasatdān*. Lahore: Qaumi Publishers.
- Rawjee, M. (1988, November 30). *The committee consisted of Vardaq, Sheikh Rasheed and MaulanaFazal*. Nawa-i-Waqt, p. 18.
- Sadiq, M. (1989, April 14–20). *Bizenjoko governor banānykāfaisla*. The Zindagi, p. 41.
- Shahbaz, A. H. (1990, June 14). *Wafāqihakōmatdōsobōnkonichorrahilai*. Takbīr, p. 48.
- Shahid, S. (1989, January). *Pandora's box*. The Herald, pp. 80–81.
- Tabassum, S. (2003). *Nuclear policy of the United States in South Asia: Proliferation or non-proliferation (1947–1990)*. Karachi: Royal Book Company.
- Zehra, N. (1989, June). *Shuffling the deck*. The Herald, p. 28.