Strategic Trade and Economic Dependencies: A Game-Theory Analysis of Port Access Under Taliban Rule

Abstract

This paper uses game theory to analyze the strategic deadlock in trade relations between Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. It contends that the region is stuck in a stable but destructive Nash Equilibrium, where rational, self-interested actions by each actor, such as Pakistan's use of geographic leverage, the Taliban's ideological rule, and the hedging strategies of Central Asian republics, collectively cause economic failure. The study reframes projects like CPEC and Gwadar not as solutions, but as factors that deepen a multi-level prisoner's dilemma. By applying concepts such as the Hold-Up Problem and Thucydides' Trap to the Taliban's rule, the analysis reveals why cooperation often fails. It concludes that the region's trade infrastructure is built for political leverage, not efficiency, and that escaping this impasse requires a fundamental political renegotiation, not just technical fixes